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TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY AS AN
ASSET SHIELD: AN UNJUSTIFIED
SAFE HAVEN FOR DELINQUENT
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGORS'
I. INTRODUCTION
In February of 1993, President Clinton summarized the federal
government's position on the country's child support crisis as follows:
We need tougher child support enforcement. An estimated 15
million children have parents who could pay child support but don't.
We need to make sure that they do. Parents owe billions of dollars in
child support that is unpaid-money that could go a long way toward
cutting the welfare rolls and lifting single parents out of poverty, and
money that could go a long way toward helping us control government
expenditures and reducing that debt.... I've said it before because
it's the simple truth: governments don't raise children, people do.
And even people who aren't around ought to do their part to raise the
children they bring into this world.2
Despite the nation's growing intolerance, millions of parents disregard their
child support obligation. Some of these parents legally frustrate child support
collection attempts through use of a method of owning property unique to
married couples and currently recognized by at least twenty-five states,3 known
as the tenancy by the entirety." The entireties concept of concurrent ownership
provides the couple with the security of knowing that their property will remain
part of the marital estate unless they both decide otherwise.' The couple's
interests in the property are virtually unobtainable by third-parties and cannot be
1. In 1989, 88% of all custodial parents were women. BUREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 52, table 69 (1991). Thus, the vast
majority of child support obligors were men. Therefore, this note will use the masculine pronoun
when refemng to delinquent child support obligors and the feminine pronoun when referring to
custodial parents. The gender usage herein is meant only to reflect these statistics. Nothing further
should be inferred.
2. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, Vol. XV, No. 3(March 1993) at 1 (quoting President Clinton's address to the National Governor's Association Mid-
Winter Meeting, Feb. 2, 1993).
3. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
4. For a description of the tenancy by the entirety and a discussion of its characteristics, see
infra text accompanying notes 177-238.
5. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
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altered or diminished by their individual actions.6 This untouchable nature of
the entireties estate is a result of a common law notion conceived centuries
ago.' While the tenancy's inviolability to third-parties is obviously beneficial
to married couples, the effects of this inviolability can result in serious
inequities.' The following is an example of one of these side-effects and
demonstrates a context where recognition of the estate's common law
characteristics is particularly indefensible.
After Julie and Alex Bellwood's contested divorce, Julie received custody
of the couple's young children, Madison and Vicky.9 The court granted Alex
visitation rights and ordered him to pay sixty-five dollars per week in child
support. Alex honored the support order for approximately six months then,
without notice to Julie, he suddenly disappeared. After several weeks of
contacting Alex's friends and relatives, Julie learned that he had moved to
Marathon, Florida. She wrote Alex several times asking him to comply with the
court-ordered child support. Her letters went unanswered. Finally,
approximately one year after the divorce, Julie gambled the small amount of
money she had available and hired an attorney, who initiated contempt
proceedings.' 0
The DeKalb Circuit Court in Indiana found Alex in contempt and ordered
him to pay approximately $2500 in child support arrears. Julie then attempted
to enforce the judgment by hiring yet another attorney in Monroe County,
Florida, to seek a garnishment of Alex's wages and attachment of his property.
Unfortunately, Alex had moved again and could not be located.
6. For instance, in most states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety, if one spouse fails to
repay a loan, the creditor cannot seek repayment by attaching a lien to the entireties property and
forcing its sale. For purposes of repayment of an individual debt, it is as if the entireties property
did not exist as a marital asset. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
7. The precise origin of the tenancy by the entirety is unknown. See infra text accompanying
notes 177-83.
8. The inviolability of the tenancy by the entirety frustrates creditors seeking to collect a
tenant's debts. See infra text accompanying notes 222-28. It is often an obstacle in bankruptcy
proceedings. See infra text accompanying notes 232-38. It permits delinquent taxpayers to avoid
the Internal Revenue Service's powerful collection methods. See infra note 278 and accompanying
text. It can undermine the policies of federal drug forfeiture laws. See infra notes 283-335 and
accompanying text. In each of these situations, the tenancy by the entirety is an obstacle, from the
third-party's viewpoint, to a fair and equitable resolution of the dispute.
9. The case study of the introduction to this note is real. The events occurred in the mid-1980s.
The information was provided by attorney Allen R. Stout [hereinafter STOUT-CASE STUDY], a
general practitioner in Angola, Indiana, and the inspiration for this note. Mr. Stout agreed to
provide the factual details of this example; however, the names have been changed to protect the
confidentiality of the parties involved.
10. The Sheriff's Department of Monroe County, Florida, served Alex with a copy of the
contempt petition and directed him to appear before the DeKalb Circuit Court in Indiana; he was not
present at the hearing. STOUT-CASE STUDY, supra note 9.
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Julie's Indiana attorney hired a private investigator to locate Alex and
determine both his employment status and the extent of his assets. The
investigator determined that Alex was re-married, was working as a musician
on a cruise ship, lived in a home valued at approximately $250,000, and owned
a forty-foot boat and two cars." Meanwhile, Alex's child support arrearage
had increased to nearly $7000 because of his continued nonpayment. Julie had
incurred roughly $2000 in legal expenses, 12 and Madison and Vicky had gone
without Alex's support for over two years. Although Alex's wages could be
garnished, it would take more than one year before Madison and Vicky were
paid the support owed to them.'3 Julie's arrearage judgment could not be
immediately satisfied because none of Alex's property could be reached. This
is because he had purchased and held title to all of his property as tenants by the
entirety with his new wife.
The foregoing example is representative of the frustration faced by custodial
parents across the country.' 4  The only obstacle to Julie's immediate
satisfaction of her valid arrearage judgment was the fact that Alex placed his
assets in a tenancy by the entirety with his second wife. Interestingly, had Alex
purchased this property with his new spouse as tenants in common or joint
tenants, 5 Julie's arrearage judgment could have been satisfied. 6 The only
difference between the way Alex and his second wife possessed their assets and
11. The investigator also found that Alex made a substantial profit by charging tourists for rides
on his boat. The investigator could not determine how much, if any, of this income was reported
to the Internal Revenue Service. STOUT-CASE STUDY, supra note 9.
12. The Rules of Ethics in Indiana, and in many other states, prohibit attorneys from accepting
domestic relations cases on a contingency fee basis. See, e.g., Barelli v. Levin, 247 N.E.2d 847
(Ind. Ct. App. 1969); Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1982); Thompson v. Thompson, 319 S.E.2d315 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984). See generally Wenona Y. Whitfield, Where the Wind Blows: Fee
Shifting in Domestic Relations Cases, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811 (1987).
13. Only a portion of Alex's salary could be applied toward his arrearage. STOUT-CASE
STUDY, supra note 9. See infra note 115 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
mechanics of wage garnishment.
14. For an estimation of the frequency with which the tenancy by the entirety precludes
immediate recovery of child support arrearages, see infra text accompanying notes 244-51.
15. For an explanation of the various methods of concurrent ownership, see infra note 185 and
accompanying text.
16. Alex did not pay more to enjoy the protection afforded by the entireties method of
concurrent ownership. He did not encounter additional legal complexities or file special documents
with the court or recorder's office. Alex's purchases undoubtedly occurred without the assistance
of an attorney. Indeed, Alex may have been completely unaware of the precise manner in which
he and his wife shared ownership of the property.
Many married couples, even those in the legal profession, have absolutely no idea which
method of concurrent ownership governs their property. Many couples probably believe that their
property is either owned by one spouse, because that spouse's name is on the deed, or both spouses,
because both names are on the deed. If both names are on the deed, then most couples probably
assume that they own the property "together." Undoubtedly, the nuances of "togetherness" are
often unexplored.
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the other methods of concurrent ownership was the language of their deeds.'7
Consequently, Julie's attorney was faced with the unpleasant task of explaining
that Julie's children must recycle last year's school clothes because of the way
the law treats a sentence in the deeds of their father's house and forty-foot
pleasure boat. Stated another way, the law permitted Alex to avoid immediate
repayment of court-ordered child support by choosing to hold his property by
the entireties with his new wife.
Not only does the outcome of Julie's case seem exceedingly unfair, well
established public policy mandates a different result.'" Federal and state
legislatures have enacted a litany of statutes seeking to ensure that child support
payments are consistently made and, if not, at least are collected.' 9  In
addition, private organizations have emerged across the country to supplement
governmental efforts.' Nevertheless, billions of dollars in child support
remain uncollected at the end of each year.2" The reasons for the national
default rate are numerous.' This Note proposes to eliminate one of them:
tenancy by the entirety as an asset shield.
This Note's proposal for removing the tenancy by the entirety obstacle to
child support collection is straightforward. Although significant differences
exist,' the custodial parent with an arrearage judgment against her' former
17. The precise language required to create the various concurrent estates varies significantly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. As a general illustration, the deeds may read as follows:
Tenants in common: Grantor grants to Husband and Wife, as tenants in common, in equal
shares. AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership
§ 75:61 (1989).
Joint tenants: Grantor grants to Husband and Wife, as joint tenants, and not as
tenants in common, with full right of survivorship. Id. § 75:21.
Tenants by the entirety: Grantor grants to Husband and Wife, and to the survivor, as tenants
by the entireties, and not as tenants in common or joint tenants. AM.
JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Husband and Wife § 139:115 (1985).
18. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 86-161.
20. Several for-profit organizations, such as Find Dads, Inc., have a toll-free number, charge
no application fee, and keep a percentage of whatever they collect from the delinquent obligers.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
22. Among them are: the defects in current child support legislation, see infra text
accompanying notes 132-53, 156-61; the nature of the weekly child support obligation itself, see
infra text accompanying notes 163-64; and the physical, mental, and financial condition of the child
support obligor, see infra text accompanying notes 166-70.
23. Indeed, these differences justify the creation of an exception to the entireties estate's
insulation from creditors. See infra text accompanying notes 56-74.
24. See supra note 1 for an explanation of gender usage. The feminine pronoun will not be
footnoted in the remainder of this note.
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spouse is in a position most closely analogous to a judgment creditor.' This
Note's proposed approach to tenancy by the entirety would change the custodial
parent's position. Because of the special nature of the child support obligation,
this Note argues that the antiquated notions supporting the impervious
characteristics of the entireties estate should yield when a tenant fails to support
his' children from a previous marriage. Under this proposal," Julie would
be able to obtain a court order forcing a public sale of Alex's property. The
proceeds of the sale would be divided between Alex's new wife and Julie for the
benefit of Madison and Vicky. ' In sum, the existence of an arrearage
judgment against an entireties tenant would convert the entireties estate into a
tenancy in common for the purpose of satisfying the judgment.
The proposition of giving a tenancy by the entirety the legal effect of a
tenancy in common for the narrow purpose of satisfying a child support
arrearage may seem relatively uncontroversial at first glance. However, it
necessarily treads on the ancient ground of American property law." As a
result, its justification must be firmly based on sound policy and reasoning.
This Note seeks to accomplish that task by first providing an overview of
the nation's child support crisis in Section II.' Section II will further explain
the social and legal significance of the parent-child relationship, the effects of
failure to honor the parental support obligation accompanying the relationship,
and the alarming rate at which noncustodial parents neglect their obligations.
Section III will discuss the governmental and judicial attempts to address the
child support problem, and their various shortcomings.3 Section IV will
discuss the tenancy by the entirety method of property ownership.' This
section will explain the history of the tenancy, its common law incidents, and
the current status of the estate, emphasizing its asset-shielding characteristics.
After discussing the unique characteristics of the modem entireties estate,
Section IV will attempt to estimate the estate's contribution to the child support
25. In the context of Julie's case, Julie was in no better position to collect Alex's support
arrearage through attachment and sale of his entireties property than Alex's credit card company
would have been had he failed to make his monthly payments. Neither Julie nor the credit card
company could force a sale of the property in order to satisfy Alex's financial obligation.
26. See supra note 1 for an explanation of gender usage. The masculine pronoun will not be
footnoted in the remainder of this note.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 339-49.
28. Of course, the proceeds of the sale subject to division would only include the difference
between the estimated fair market value of the property and the amount owed to third parties with
an interest in the property. See infra text accompanying notes 359-61.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 177-83.
30. See ifra text accompanying notes 37-85.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 86-176.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 177-258.
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crisis discussed in Section ll." As a means of establishing precedent for the
proposed modification of the entireties estate's inviolability to third parties,
Section V will briefly discuss how the similar inviolability of state homestead
exemptions can be overcome by the federal government's interest in collecting
taxes.' The remainder of Section V will explore the government's ability to
"pierce" the entireties estate through federal civil forfeiture laws.35 Finally,
Section VI offers a statute that permits satisfaction of arrearage judgments
through the forced sale of entireties property.' This section will conclude with
an analysis of the policies supporting and opposing a child support exception to
the tenancy's judgment-proof incidents.
II. THE CRISIS OF CHILD SUPPORT NONCOLLECrION
A. The Unique Parental Obligation to Provide Child Support
The relationship between parents and children is unique in many
respects.37 A fundamental concept of the relationship, entrenched in society's
attitude toward family life,' is the parents' responsibility to provide for the
needs of their children.39 Almost 100 years ago, Sir William Blackstone
concluded that this obligation derives from natural law, given to parents not only
33. See infra text accompanying notes 244-51.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 259-82.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 283-335.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 339-86.
37. Obviously, the parent-child relationship is a special, non-voluntary familial relationship,
resulting from the creation of life. The act of procreation has been described as "at once one of the
most selfish and selfless phenomena" because it simultaneously satisfies the human ego's desire for
immortality and results in a relationship that often leads to years of parental sacrifice for the benefit
of the child. Deborah A. Batta, I Didn 't Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and
a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1264 (1990).
The depth of a parent's natural concern for the well-being of his or her children is manifest
even in the subconscious. One author reported, "The distinguishing trait of all nightmares is that
the dreamer is endangered. Parents are the exception: they dream their babies are in trouble." Id.
at 1265 (citing Sharon Begley, The Stuff That Dreams Are Made Of, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1989,
at 41, 43).
38. Paul G. Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal For Reform, 52 GEO. L.J. 499,
500 (1964). Professor Haskell emphatically suggests that child care is a parental obligation which
is woven deeply into the fabric of our society. Id. He argues: "If it were suggested that [legal
enforcement of] such duties [was] improper, . . . it is doubtful that one would attract a following
except from among the dissolute and the depraved. Such is the moral sensitivity of our society."
Id.
39. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA; PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR
NEGOTIATING-ANDCOLLECTING-A FAIR SETrLEMENTat xi (1986) (citing Blackstone as suggesting
that the parental obligation to provide child care was "so fundamental that it was part of the natural
law, the instinctive order of existence").
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by nature itself, but by their own act of reproduction. ® Blackstone observed
that parents "would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only
gave their children life that they might afterwards see them perish. " 4' Nature,
however, is not alone in the crusade to urge compliance with the mandate to
provide child care. The legal system is a powerful ally.
In the context of the traditional family unit,42 the significance of the
parental obligation is reflected generally in the laws of intestacy 0  and
neglect." Parents clearly have the right to bear children,' but with that right
comes the obligation to care for those children 6 and, among other things, the
requirement that parents provide for their children's educational needs.47 When
the traditional family terminates in divorce, however, legal mandates to honor
40. 1 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447.
41. Id.
42. The traditional family, consisting of two parents living with children, is rapidly becoming
a rare phenomenon. In 1990, only 26% of all households fit the traditional family definition.
MONTHLY NEWS FROM THE U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Census and You, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Feb.
1991) at 3. This figure compares with 31% in 1980 and 40% in 1970. Id.
43. Bans, supra note 37, at 1218. In approximately 20 jurisdictions in the United States, the
bond between parent and child, and its imposition of a parental support obligation, to some degree
supplants individual testamentary freedom. Id. at 1213-14. In jurisdictions following a family
maintenance system, dependent children can seek judicial intervention if they are excluded from their
parents' wills. Id.
Natural law theorists justified the presumption that, upon death, the property of the deceased
should be distributed among family members rather than returning to the common pool by reasoning
that such a presumption is "of nature." HUOO GROTIUS, DE JURE BEi i Ac PACtS, LIBRI TRES
265,269 (Francis W. Kelset trans., 1925). Diordorus Siculus astutely observed that "[n]ature is the
best teacher of all animate beings as regards the preservation not only of themselves but also of their
offspring, to the end that as a result of this affection for kin the stock by uninterrupted succession
may complete the circle of eternity. Id. at 270.
44. All states have enacted statutes to protect children from parental neglect, ill-treatment, and
abuse. 42 AM. JUR. 2DInfants § 16 (1969). These statutes provide for the removal of the neglected
children from their present custodian, punishment of the offender, or both. Id. Furthermore, courts
have agreed that, in an appropriate case, the state may interfere with the parent-child relationship
to insure that the child obtains proper medical treatment, where the child's life or health is
endangered and the parent has unreasonably refused to allow such treatment on religious grounds
or otherwise. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (I1.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
45. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974) (affirming the right "to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child" recognized in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972)).
46. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (emphasizing that "the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder").
47. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding that parents have a natural duty to
provide their children with an education suitable to the family's station in life).
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the parental support obligation become far more persuasive. '
After divorce, the noncustodial parent's principal means of providing for
his children is through child support payments. The nature of the parent-child
relationship provides a substantial justification for the unique rules of law
governing the enforcement of child support orders."' Unlike other financial
obligations, noncustodial parents usually cannot avoid child support through the
use of a personal contract.' Further, unlike other financial transactions,
including alimony and spousal maintenance,5 child support payments are not
taxable as income to the recipiente2 and a tax deduction is not allowed to the
payor.53 Child support arrearages, unlike many other personal debts, are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.' Most remarkable, however, is that child
support noncompliance, unlike nonpayment of any other debt, can result in
incarceration.' While the parent-child relationship justifies the parental
obligation to provide support, the effects of noncompliance with that obligation
justify extraordinary treatment by the law.
B. The Effects of Child Support Nonpayment on Children and Mothers
When a debtor fails to make regular payments on a mortgage or credit
card, the creditor can simply impose a penalty or increase the rates for its other
customers.' In the long run, the creditor usually recoups the loss. In
48. See infra text accompanying notes 89-161.
49. Much of the incentive for strong child support enforcement laws is derived from the
government's desire to avoid assuming the financial responsibility of child care. See infra text
accompanying notes 105-10.
50. The Uniform Marital Property Act prohibits marital property agreements which adversely
affect the right of a child to support. UNIF. MARrrAL PROP. ACT, 9A U.L.A. 121 § 10(b) (1987);
Patrick N. Parkinson, Who Needs The Uniform Marital ProperryAct?, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 677,679
(1987).
51. I.R.C. § 215 (1991).
52. Id. § 71.
53. Id.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994). The only exceptionto discharge that applies to both Chapter
7 bankruptcy and non-hardship Chapter 13 bankruptcy is the exception for alimony, maintenance,
and support. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994); James H. Gold, The Dischargeability of Divorce
Obligations Under the Bankruptcy Code: Five Faulty Premises in the Application of Section
523(a)(5), 39 CAsE. W. RES. L. REV. 455, 456 (1988-89).
55. In most states, non-support is a misdemeanor. IRA M. ELLMAN Er AL., FAMILY LAW 418
(2d ed. 1991). In the remaining states, the maximum incarceration is typically three years. Id. For
a discussion of civil and criminal contempt, see infra text accompanying notes 154-61.
56. State law generally enforces contract provisions entitling a creditor to the payment and
accrual of a higher interest rate upon a debtor's default. See Melanie Rovner Cohen et al.,
Enudement of Secured Creditors to Default Interest Rates Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 506(b)
and 1124, 45 Bus. Aw. 415 (1989). A default interest rate provision may not be enforceable if
the rate is extraordinarily high. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985) (prohibiting
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contrast, the intended recipients of child support cannot spread the loss, and the
resulting injury is often permanent. Although noncompliance by the obligor
affects us all,57 dependent children and their mothers experience particularized
and continuing injury when obligors fail to pay child support.
Children of delinquent obligors suffer financially, socially, academically,
and psychologically.' The direct economic impact of nonsupport on children
is obvious-they become poorer.59 Less obvious are the related noneconomic
consequences.' Lower "income" often forces mothers to relocate to lower
cost housing."' The move separates the children from their friends and
classmates, thereby eliminating a much needed source of support and
stability.' The child's loss of a solid social structure, coupled with the sense
of abandonment from the obligor's apparent disregard for the child's well-
being,' can lead to both behavioral problems and decreased academic
performance.' Finally, the dependent family's reduced "income" often
unconscionable rates); N.Y. GEN. OBLO. LAw § 5-501 (McKinney 1989) (explaining that interest
cannot be usurious).
57. Simply put, when the obligor disregards his obligation, the taxpayers, through government
programs, are forced to assume it. See infra text accompanying notes 105-10.
58. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 24.
59. Id. at 22. National statistics undeniably demonstrate that staggering numbers of children
live in poverty because they do not receive the support owed them. S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 42 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8145. Furthermore, since the amount
of child support typically cannot be modified after the final decree absent changed circumstances,
some commentators argue that children often suffer economic hardship even when child support is
paid. Carol S. Bruch & Norma J. Wikler, The Economic Consequences, Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Fall
1985, at 5, 20. See also Carol S. Bruch, Developing Standards for Child Support Payments: A
Critique of Current Practice, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 49 (1982), reprinted in 1 AM. BAR ASS'N,
IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE (1986) [hereinafter ABA VOL.1].
The fixed child support award can decrease in buying power because the cost of child care
increases as children grow older, due to increased food consumption and greater involvement in
activities. Sharon J. Badertscher, Ohio's Mandatory Child Support Guidelines: Child Support or
Spousal Maintenance?, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 297, 306 (1992). Of course, the adequacy of
even regular child support payments is further reduced by inflation and general cost of living
increases. Id. The average amount of child support payments received per child per year rose from
$1800 in 1970, to $2110 in 1981, but after inflation adjustments, the real buying power actually
decreased by 16%. LEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 11.
60. LUEBERmAN, supra note 39, at 22.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 24. According to one study, children who did not receive regular support "were
much more likely to suffer intensely with the recurrent concern that their father did not love them
. " Id. Furthermore, if the father obviously enjoyed a more financially comfortable lifestyle
than the mother and children, yet failed to make regular support payments, the children "were likely
to be angry and depressed for many years and to remain preoccupied with this discrepancy in living
standard." Id.
64. Id. at 22.
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requires the mother to take on additional jobs or work longer hours, thus
reducing the availability of what may be the last source of familial stability-the
child's mother. 6
5
Although single mothers are not the intended beneficiaries of child support,
they are nonetheless often devastated financially as a result of nonpayment.n6
Usually, women are not the primary breadwinners prior to the divorce.'
Therefore, when child support is not forthcoming, or the award amount is
inadequate, 6t mothers often attempt to increase their income in the job market
without the necessary skills to compete.' Furthermore, even qualified women
are disadvantaged because of persistent inequalities in pay scales between the
sexes.' The combination of nonsupport and women's second-class status in
65. JUDrH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVINO THE BREAKUP: How
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE wITH DivoRcs 25 (1980).
66. Even if support is paid regularly, it can lead to a disparate financial effect on women.
LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 19. Since judges tend to base the support award on the father's
income, rather than the actual cost of raising children, mothers are forced to continue where the
support award leaves off. Id. at 20. As discussed in supra note 59, the financial burden of child
care increases as children get older and inflation rises. As a result, "[miothers with custody pay
well over half the costs of childrearing." Laurie Woods, Child Support: A National Disgrace, 17
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 538, 538 (1983). The problem is further exacerbated by women's
disadvantaged earning capacity in the labor market. Diana Pearce, Welfare Is Not for Women:
Toward a Model of Advocacy to Meet the Needs of Women in Poverty, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv.
412, 413 (1985). The overall result of these factors is that men typically enjoy an increased standard
of living after divorce, and women suffer a sharp decrease, even if support payments are faithfully
paid. Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: An Empirical Study of
Property, Alimony, and Child Support Awards, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4037, 4053 (1982) (citing
an average increase in a noncustodial father's standard of living of 42% after divorce, compared to
an average 73 % decrease in a custodial mother's living standard); James B. McLindon, Separate but
Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorcefor Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 353
(1987) (stating that "while men enjoy a substantial increase in their per capita income following
divorce, women (and children of whom they generally receive custody) experience an equally
substantial decline"). In an interview of Los Angeles judges, Lenore Weitzman found that many
judges viewed public assistance and remarriage as "preferable solutions" to an inadequate support
award, and judges would rather pursue these alternatives than impose a greater financial burden on
noncustodial fathers. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 20.
67. Badertacher, supra note 59, at 303.
68. See supra note 66.
69. Badertacher, supra note 59, at 303.
70. In 1987, the median hourly wage for men above the age of 16 was $7.77, while women
in the same age group earned $5.60 per hour, 72% of their male counterparts' earnings. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLErIN No. 2307, LABOR FORcE STATISTICS
DERIVED FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 1948-87, at 735 (1988). Women over the age
of 25 earned $0.67 for every dollar earned by men over the age of 25. Id.
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the labor force, known as "feminization of poverty,""' is in large part
responsible for the disproportionate number of single mothers living below the
poverty level.' In 1981, the poverty rate for female householders was triple
the rate for male householders and five times the rate for intact families.Y In
1990, 53.4 percent of all children in female-headed families lived in poverty.74
As these statistics show, custodial parents desperately need money to support
their children. Unfortunately, noncustodial parents often do not respond to this
need.
C. The Extent of the Child Support Nonpayment Problem
Despite the special character of the parent-child relationship, its correlative
parental duty to provide child support, and the harmful effects of nonpayment
on children and mothers, many fathers simply refuse to pay child support.7'
With an alarming divorce rate and increasing numbers of children born out of
wedlock,76 the need for alternate methods of child support collection is
increasingly acute.' According to a 1989 Census Bureau survey, of all
71. See Pearce, supra note 66, at 413 (1985) (discussing "feminization of poverty'); Robert
D. Thompson & Susan F. Paikin, Formulas and Guidelines for Support, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Fall
1985, at 33 (citing insufficient child support awards and inadequate collection as the cause of
"feminization of poverty").
72. Badertscher, supra note 59, at 303; Timothy M. McLaughlin, Tennessee's Prohibition of
the Retroactive Modification of Child Support Orders, 59 TENN. L. REv. 425, 428 (1992);
LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 21.
73. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:
MONEY, INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILES IN THE U.S., 1982, No. 140 (1983).
74. 1992 GREEN BOOK, COM. ON WAYS & MEANS 1166 (1992). One study showed that after
couples with a pre-divorce income of $40,000 or more divorce, the wife and children live at roughly
one half their previous income level, while the husband's financial capacity doubles. LIEBERMAN,
supra note 39, at 19-21.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 78-85.
76. The number of children born to unmarried parents and living out of wedlock skyrocketed
in the 1980s:
Year Children born and living out of wedlock
1970 399,000
1980 666,000
1985 828,000
1989 1,094,000
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONTHLY NEWS FROM THE U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS: CENSUS AND YOU, May 1992, at 10.
77. In 1930, only one out of every six marriages ended in divorce. Keith D. Ross, Sharing
Debts: Creditors and Debtors Under the Uniform Marital Property Act, 69 MINN. L. REv. 111,
134 (1984). By 1980, the number increased to one in two. Id. In 1982, approximately one million
couples divorced, leaving roughly 500,000 children in need of support from the non-custodial parent.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 130, POPULATION PROFILE
OF THE UNITED STATES 14 (1982). It is estimated that by the end of the 1990s, 1.6 million couples
will divorce annually. Darilyn T. Olidge, Divorce Liens Under Section 522(0 of the Federal
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mothers awarded child support, only fifty-one percent received the full amount
due.' Another twenty-four percent received partial payment, and twenty-five
percent received nothing.79 These percentages translate into the disquieting fact
that in 1989, over 2.8 million custodial mothers received either none or only
part of the support amounts ordered for the care of their children.' This
statistic deserves more than a cursory reading. Stated another way, the number
of custodial mothers who received less than full child support payments was
greater than the total number of residents of Wyoming, Alaska, Vermont, North
Dakota, and Delaware combined."'
In financial terms, the Census Bureau estimated that $16.3 billion in child
support was due in 19 8 9 .' Of the total support due, $5.1 billion, or thirty-one
percent, was not received.'s This amount could feed each of the sixteen
million children who lived in a single mother household in 1990 4 for an entire
month.8 5 This low collection rate is especially surprising in light of over forty
years of governmental attempts to ensure that child support is paid.
III. EXISTING CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION METHODS
Family law, including the law of child support, has traditionally been left
to the states." In 1935, the federal government became marginally involved
by creating the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program as
part of the Social Security Act." The program provided federal money
through the states to relatives of children with deceased fathers so that the
children could be removed from community institutions.' The program was
soon extended to provide assistance when fathers deserted their children and
Bankruptcy Code: Resoling Tensions Between Family and Bankruptcy Law, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv.
879, 879 (1992).
78. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (1991) [hereinafter 16TH ANNUAL REPORT].
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. THE BOOK OF THE STATES 637, 640, 653, 659, 661 (Council of State Govt's 1994-95 ed.)[hereinafter BOOK OF STATES] (reporting current population for each of the 50 states).
82. 16TH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 78, at 4-5.
83. Id. The rate of non-payment typically depends on the type of support arrangement.
ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 403. In 1985, women with voluntary written support agreements
collected 81% of the amount due. Id. In contrast, women with court-ordered support awards
received only 56% of the amount they were owed. Id.
84. In 1990, 16 million children lived in households with an absent father. 16TH ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 78, at 3.
85. Assuming three meals per day at roughly $3.50 each.
86. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 5.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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refused to pay child support.s"
In 1950, following the lead of several state statutes,' the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association promulgated the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), 9' which was
specifically directed at child support collection.92 This Act, now adopted by
every state, 3 improved interstate collections and encouraged similarity in
enforcement procedures among the states, by permitting custodial parents to
enforce the judgments of local child support lawsuits in foreign jurisdictions."
Unfortunately, the Act was not without defects.95 It provided scant motivation
to local prosecutors because it did not grant priority status to child support
claims."6 Also, it was useless to children whose absent fathers had remained
in the same state because it governed only interstate child support collection.
97
Finally, the Act could not keep pace with society's rapid mobility following
World War II.9
URESA was amended in the 1950s and, in 1968, adopted in a modified
form as the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
89. Id.
90. In 1949, New York passed legislation that permitted mothers or children to bring child
support lawsuits in their state of residence, and enforce the resulting judgments in the state where
the father was located. IUEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 5-6. Ten other states quickly followed suit.
Id. at 6.
91. See Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) prefatory note to 1950 Act,
9B U.L.A. 556 (1987). For state adaptations of URESA, see, for example, ALA. CODE §§ 30-4-80
to -98 (1989 & Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.25.010-.270 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46b-180 to -211 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 601-640 (1993); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 30-301 to -326 (1993 & Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-2-1-1 to -39 (West
1979 & Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW §§ 10-301 to -340 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
92. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at 11-52; LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 6.
93. For a description of the various URESA laws throughout the United States, see ABA
VOL.1, supra note 59, at 11-52.
94. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 6.
95. Id. A recent study found that states fail to act quickly on URESA petitions and that "the
Act's reciprocity requirement did not translate into sufficient time, staff, and energy to enforce
foreign support orders adequately." ROBERT HOROWITZ ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERvS., REMEDIES UNDER THE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AMENDMENTS OF 1984, at 1-2
(1985) (citing CENTER FOR HUMAN SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTIONS STUDY (1985)). As a result, URESA proceedings are
notorious for extraordinarily lengthy delays, often leading to less than satisfactory results. 2 AM.
BAR ASs'N, IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE 11-160 (1986) [hereinafter ABA VOL.2].
96. IEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 6. Child support enforcement claims are often considered
less urgent than other matters requiring prosecutorial attention. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at 11-
82.
97. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 6.
98. Id.
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(RURESA).' Although it did not address the shortcomings of URESA,
RURESA included two noteworthy provisions. First, it provided that a URESA
order in one court could not automatically nullify, nor be nullified by, an order
made by a different court, regardless of issuance priority.'tm  Second, it
provided that the duty to provide support could not be affected by the custodial
parent's interference with the obligor's visitation or custody rights.''
In 1974, Congress enacted Title IV-D of the Social Security Act,102
establishing the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement in the Department
of Health and Human Services."m This legislation forced federal, state, and
local governments into active involvement in establishing and collecting child
support. "° The rationale for increased government involvement in the field
of domestic relations was "a concern for the public purse."" Congress hoped
to shift the expanding burden of child care from the federally subsidized AFDC
99. See Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) historical note, 9B
U.L.A. 382 (1987). For state adaptations of RURESA, see, for example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-1651 to -1691 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-14-101 to -806 (Michie 1993); CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE §§ 1650-1698.3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-5-101 to -144
(1987 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 88.011-.371 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19-11-40 to -81 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
100. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at 11-154. One interesting result of this section is that an
obligor may be simultaneously subject to conflicting orders. Id. See Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation,
Construction and Effect of Provision of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act That No
Support Order Shall Supersede or Nullify Any Other Order, 31 A.L.R. 4TH 347 (1984).
101. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at 11-154. RURESA codifies the notion that visitation and
support are separate obligations, and the breach of one does not justify the breach of the other. This
rule can lead to highly questionable results. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Tibbett, 267 Cal. Rptr.
642, 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that even where the custodial parent had concealed a child
from the non-custodial parent for eight years, the non-custodial parent was obligated to honor the
support obligation).
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (1988).
103. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 404.
104. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at 1-150. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act conditions
state receipt of federal AFDC funds on the state's establishment of child support enforcement
agencies (IV-D agencies) to help custodial parents locate absent parents, establish paternity, and
obtain and enforce child support orders. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 404. Previously, these
agencies had little incentive to provide services to families not receiving AFDC money. Id. at 405.
Taxpayers finance the AFDC recipients and are therefore financially interested in the IV-D agency's
success in collecting support as reimbursement for AFDC awards. Id. Non-AFDC families pose
a significantly reduced threat to the public's collective pocketbook. Id. Under IV-D, however, the
agencies are required to give non-AFDC families equal access to their services. Carter v. Morrow,
562 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
105. EU.MAN, supra note 55, at 404. "In the United States, child support and taxes are the
only personal financial obligations routinely enforced by public agencies." David L. Chambers,
Men Who Know They Are Watched: Some Benefits and Costs of Jailing for Nonpayment of Support,
75 MicH. L. REv. 900, 933 (1977).
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programs"°1 to the delinquent parents.' 07  As one Ohio appellate judge
correctly observed, "Mhe obligation to support one's own children is one owed
to the public generally."" The public is owed this obligation because when
child support orders are ignored, custodial parents are often forced to apply to
AFDC programs, programs that are financed by the federal taxpayers."e
Simply put, when noncustodial parents do not pay child support, the public does
in one way or another. °"0
Unsatisfied with the existing programs and frustrated by the growing
problem of child support nonpayment, Congress significantly modified child
support law when it enacted the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
1984 (CSEA)." Unlike previous statutes, the CSEA, which amended Title
IV of the Social Security Act, required that the states improve their child
support enforcement by enacting several specific remedies and procedures." 2
The mandatory nature of the CSEA was its hallmark."
3
Among other things," 4  the CSEA included an automatic wage
withholding provision that required each state to impose mandatory wage
attachment when an obligor's arrearage equaled one month's support
obligation. 5 The CSEA directed the states to intercept state income tax
106. In 1992, the AFDC program cost federal taxpayers $14.8 billion. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T, FISCAL YEAR 1994, app. at 624 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 BUDGET]. For a description of the origin and evolution of the AFDC program, see
LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 5.
107. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 404. See also ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at 11-150.
108. Hacker v. Hacker, 448 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (quoting State v. Ducey,
266 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970)).
109. Badertacher, supra note 59, at 304 (citing Vicki Pohlman & Geoffrey P. Walker, H.R.
4325 and H. 614. Federal and State Answers to Economic Child Abuse?, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV.
139, 139 (1985)).
110. See McLaughlin, supra note 72, at 428.
111. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-
667 (1988). See LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 77.
112. HORowrrz, supra note 95, at 2.
113. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at U-150.
114. The CSEA requires state domestic relations offices to report support arrearages exceeding
$1000 to consumer credit reporting agencies. ABA VOL. 1, supra note 59, at 1-101. It also forbids
states from denying paternity actions at any time prior to a child's 18th birthday. Id. The CSEA
also prohibits retroactive modification of support orders and arrearages, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)
(1988), and requires states to establish child support guidelines either by statute or judicial or
administrative action. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at H-153.
115. Id. at 1-101. With some exceptions, the withholding process begins the "day the triggering
delinquency occurs" when the state agency is to send a proposed withholding notice to the obligor.
42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(3) (1985). Once initiated, the wage withholding procedure continues over time,
thereby avoiding the time and expense of return trips to court. HOROwITZ, supra note 95, at 2.
The CSEA's automatic wage withholding mandate has been described as by far the most
important element of the statute. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at 1-150. Withholding is established
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refund checks to satisfy arrearages pursuant to the Tax Refund Intercept
Program." 6 The CSEA also required states to provide non-AFDC families
federal income tax offsets from delinquent obligors' tax returns."' Further,
each state was charged with establishing a process for imposing liens against real
and personal property to enforce support orders"8 and a process for providing
by a simple court process, and it guarantees predictable and regular payments so long as the obligor
remains employed. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 84. Depending upon the local statute, income
subject to withholding may include wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses, independent contractor
income, disability benefits, pension benefits, annuities, workers' compensation, awards from civil
lawsuits, interest, dividends, rents, royalties, insurance proceeds, trust income, and partnership
profits. HOROWITZ, supra note 95, at 7.
Under the CSEA, the amount withheld equals the current support, plus the employer's
withholding fee, so long as the total is within the limits of § 303(b) of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act (CCPA). Id. at 23 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(1) (1985)). If an arrearage is due and
the support obligation plus the employer's fee does not exceed the CCPA limit, then an additional
amount, defined by state law, must be withheld to satisfy the arrearage. HORowrrz, supra note 95,
at 23. The CCPA limit for an obligor with a second family is 50% of disposable income and the
limit for an unmarried obligor is 60%. Id. at 23-24. Each limit increases by five percent if an
arrearage is due as defined by the CCPA. Id. at 24.
116. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at 1-101, The intercept program may only be used through
IV-D agencies. Id. at U-152; see also HOROWITZ, supra note 95, at 41; 42 U.S.C. § 664(a) (1988);
45 C.F.R. § 303.72 (1989). The program cannot be used for spousal support, and the arrearage
amount must be at least $500. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at U-152. The procedure works as
follows: A custodial parent who believes the delinquent obligor is entitled to a tax refund pays an
application fee for the intercept service. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 88. The support
enforcement agency submits the claim to the Internal Revenue Service and state tax office. Id.
Then the delinquent obligor is notified that his or her refund will be intercepted and given an
opportunity to contest the interception. Id. Also, if the delinquent obligor is remarried and files
jointly with a new spouse, the agency must notify both taxpayers and afford the new spouse an
opportunity to claim a portion of the tax refund. ABA VOL.], supra note 59, at 11-152. If no
extraordinary reason for avoiding the intercept is demonstrated, such as mistake of fact or lack of
jurisdiction, the refund is used as necessary in order to satisfy the obligor's support debt. Id. Since
the limits of the CCPA do not apply, see supra note 115, the entire refund is available to the
obligee. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974); Usery v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 586
F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1978).
117. HOROWITZ, supra note 95, at 2. The federal income tax refund offset programs, coupled
with mandatory wage withholding, were designed to improve interstate collection. Id. The IV-D
agency may charge an application fee of $25 or less for the federal income tax refund offset service
to non-AFDC clients. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at II-150.
118. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at 1-101. The CSEA requires states to enact "[p]rocedures
under which liens are imposed against real and personal property for amounts of overdue support
owed by an absent parent who resides or owns property in the state." HOROWITZ, supra note 95,
at 71 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(4) (1985); 45 C.F.R. § 303.103 (1989)). Liens are basically claims
or encumbrances against property that prevent the owner from selling the property until those claims
are satisfied. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 87. The operation of liens is totally dependent on state
law. HOROwrrz, supra note 95, at 71. Some statutes treat child support liens separately from other
general liens. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 419 (citing, e.g., NEB REv. STAT. § 42-371 (1988); IND.
CODE ANN. § 12-1-6.1-22 (1989) (providing an automatic lien on motor vehicle titles)). Some states
permit support obligees to overcome the statutory lien exemptions for the type or value of property
attached. Id. at 420 (citing, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 11-607(1) (1989); Redick v. O'Brien, 468 A.2d
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bonds, securities, and other guarantees to encourage compliance with support
orders. " 9 The CSEA required that the states provide each of these procedures
to all custodial parents, whether AFDC recipients or not,"2 and regardless of
whether the case was intrastate or interstate.' 2' States meeting the minimum
standards of the CSEA and prior federal legislation were qualified to receive
federal reimbursement for the administrative costs of child support collection and
their AFDC programs. I" Collectively, the CSEA provisions represented a
significant improvement on prior governmental enforcement efforts.'"
In 1988, Congress imposed additional support enforcement requirements on
the states with its passage of the Family Support Act." The Act established
735 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1983)). Furthermore, lien enforcement procedures, through the use of URESA
or Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments actions, can be transferred across state lines.
HOROWITZ, supra note 95, at 76.
In some instances, the child support lienholder can force a sale of the obligor's property to pay
the support obligation. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 87. The most common means of enforcing
liens are writs of execution and administrative lien processes. HOROWITZ, supra note 95, at 83-84.
In either of these procedures, accommodations for notice, redemption, and fair market value vary
drastically from state to state. Id. at 84-85. However, significant restrictions apply to tenancy by
the entirety property. See infra text accompanying notes 221-38.
119. HOROWiTZ, supra note 95, at 2. Section 666(a)(6) of the CSEA requires states to adopt
procedures by which "absent parent[s] give security, post a bond, or give some other guarantee to
secure payment of overdue support . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(6) (1988). Section 666(a)(6),
although preventative, can be especially effective in ensuring compliance by the self-employed
obligor. HOROWITZ, supra note 95, at 2. This provision, the federal and state income tax refund
offsets, liens, and credit reporting, provide useful means of enforcing support orders where wage
withholding may be ineffective. Id.
120. Congress realized that IV-D agencies, although required to make some services available
to non-AFDC clients by the 1974 Act, seldom paid much attention to non-AFDC cases because,
unlike AFDC clients, non-AFDC families were not directly supported by public funds. LIEBERMAN,
supra note 39, at 78. CSEA required that all mandatory collection procedures be made available
to non-AFDC clients to assist women not poor enough to receive welfare, but not financially able
to afford private counsel. Id.
121. HOROWITZ, supra note 95, at 2. The CSEA also required the states to operate at least one
parent locator service. Id. at 108 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 654(8) (1988)). Under the CSEA, the service
must accept AFDC and non-AFDC location requests from local IV-D agencies. Id.
122. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 405.
123. HOROWiTZ, supra note 95, at 2. Congress simultaneously passed the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984 to provide an incentive for women to leave the welfare rolls. ABA VOL.1, supra note
59, at 11-150. As a prerequisite to receipt of AFDC funds, mothers must assign to the state their
children's rights to be supported by their father. Id. Since AFDC mothers receive AFDC funds in
lieu of support payments, theoretically their interest in cooperating with support enforcement is low.
Id. The CSEA gives mothers additional incentive to cooperate with enforcement efforts by
permitting them to keep the first $50 of every monthly child support collection without losing any
AFDC benefits. Id.
124. Pub. L. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 405, 503-504,602-704, 1301-
1397 (1988). Among other things, the Act requires the states to recognize a rebuttable presumption
that support awards were appropriate if computed from the state's guidelines. S. REP. No. 377,
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a national parent locator service to improve collection procedures.' 2 To
improve the efficiency of income withholding procedures, the Act required that,
beginning in 1994, all support orders must include an income withholding order
unless good cause for not ordering it is shown or the parties enter into an
alternative payment agreement.126
The government has also established a purely federal arrearage collection
technique commonly referred to as the I.R.S. Full Collection Procedure.'2 7
Title IV-D agencies, state organizations, use this procedure by certifying an
arrearage amount to the Office of Child Support which, in turn, requests the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to collect the support arrearage "as it would
attempt to collect federal taxes."" Eligibility requirements include an
arrearage of at least $750 and a showing that the custodial parent has made
reasonable attempts to collect the arrearage.' 2
Although the success of the federal effort to improve child support
collection has been substantial,' the legislation described above, as well as
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 17-19 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2776,2779,2794-96; H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 998, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 91-92 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2879-
80.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
126. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 416. This requirement was already imposed on IV-D support
cases by the CSEA. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(3), 666(a)(8) (Prospective Amendments in 1990 Supp.).
127. 26 U.S.C. § 6305 (1988). The IRS Full Collection Procedure is essentially a remedy of
last resort. ABA VOL.2, supra note 95, at U-168. The service is available only through IV-D
agencies, and requirements for its 'use are stringent. Id. In addition to the minimum arrearage
requirement of $750, and the required showing of diligent state efforts to collect, the state must
reimburse the costs of federal collection. Id. at 11-169.
128. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 420 (citing DIANE DODSON, IRS FULL COLLECTION
PROCEDURE AND USE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT REMEDIES 159 (1989)).
129. Id. The minimum arrearage requirement further states that at least six months must have
elapsed since the applicant's last request for IRS assistance, sufficient information must be provided
to help identify the obligor, and there must be "reason to believe that the debtor has assets that the
Secretary of the Treasury might levy to collect the support." ABA VOL.2, supra note 95, at 1-169
(citing 45 C.F.R. § 303.71(c), (e) (1989)). The fee for the service, successful or not, is $122.50.
Id. at 11-170A.
Of a typical caseload of 700 to 800 cases per year, in 1985, only about 100 cases resulted in
any arrearage collection. Id. However, the average collection amount was an incredible $10,000.
Id. In some cases, the recovered amount totalled more than $30,000. Id.
130. Annual collections by IV-D agencies have increased steadily since the institution of the
federal program. 1 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 6, 7 (1990). Collections rose from $2.4 billion in 1984, to $4.6 billion in 1988. Id.
In 1986, the states collected 45.8% of the total child support owed. Id. In 1988, the figure was
51.7%. Id. However, the statistical success of the IV-D agencies is misleading because much of
the increase in dollars collected is simply due to a shift from private attorney collection to IV-D
agency collection. Id.
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other support enforcement techniques, '' has obviously not eliminated the
nonsupport problem." The income withholding procedure, while the most
popular and arguably the most effective collection technique, contains several
inherent flaws. First, not all obligors earn wages." Second, income
withholding is particularly problematic when applied to the self-employed
obligor because he pays his own salary. 3 Third, every time an obligor
changes jobs, the court must issue a new withholding order to the new
employer." Fourth, if the obligor gets a job in a different state, locating him
and his employer becomes much more difficult.'37 Fifth, the amount of
withholding is limited by the Consumer Credit Protection Act,"M and states are
free to enact lower ceiling amounts.' Finally, although employers are clearly
prohibited from dismissing employees because their wages are subject to
withholding," there is a good deal of evidence that some employers disregard
this prohibition, thereby eliminating the obligor's income.' 4'
The federal and state tax intercept programs are often an effective means
of collecting child support arrearages. 42  However, they are obviously
131. See infra text accompanying notes 154-61.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 75-85.
133. In 1985, Parents Without Partners began assisting custodial parents by referring them to
other support collection services. ABA VOL.2, supra note 95, at M-161. The organization
provided its toll free number and began keeping track of the commonly reported problems of
everyday people seeking support collection. Id. Problems associated with wage withholding
included: agency personnel's general lack of accurate information regarding the applicable laws;
overloaded local agencies charged with instituting the income withholding; jurisdictional problems
such as obligers who work in one state but live in another; and deception of employers who have
some relationship to the obligor. Id. at M-162.
134. ELLmAN, supra note 55, at 416. While federal regulations (45 C.F.R. § 303.101(f)
(1989)) clearly permit the states to extend their income withholding procedures to other forms of
income, federal law requires only wage withholding. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 416.
135. HoRowrmz, supra note 95, at 116. Because of the obvious incompatibility between income
withholding and self-employment, other enforcement methods must be used. ABA VOL.1, supra
note 59, at 1-159.
136. ELLMIAN, supra note 55, at 417.
137. Id. This problem persists despite state and federal efforts through parent locator services.
Id.
138. See supra note 115 and accompanyingtext.
139. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Wilcox, 575 A.2d 127 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (imposing a limit 15%
lower than the federal ceiling); WYO. STATS. § 20-6-210 (1989) (limiting withholding to 35%
instead of the CCPA's ceiling of 50-65 %).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(6)(D) (West Supp. 1985).
141. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 417 (quoting PAULA ROBERTS, TURNING PROMISES INTO
REAuTIES: A GUIDETO IMPLEMENTING THE CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT
AcT OF 1988, at 50 (1989)). In other words, it seems that some obligors are fired because their
employer would rather not bother with the wage withholding procedures. As a result, children go
without support.
142. See supra note 129.
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available only when the delinquent obligor is entitled to a tax refund. Again,
unemployed and self-employed obligors may escape the reach of this tool.
The CSEA requires the states to facilitate child support liens on real and
personal property. 43 However, unlike its elaborate wage withholding and tax
intercept provisions, the CSEA's lien requirement lacks specificity.'" It
simply asks the states to adopt "[p]rocedures under which liens are imposed
against real and personal property for amounts of overdue support .... ""
Nothing in the provision explains the time when liens must take effect, the
duration of a lien's effectiveness, or the type of property that is exempt.'"6
Furthermore, custodial parents may incur significant nonrefundable costs when
attempting to enforce liens. '" Because of this, custodial parents are often
deterred from attempting lien attachment, especially if their lawyers are
unwilling or unable to accept contingency fees.'" More fundamentally,
however, simple lien attachment, like wage garnishment, is an inadequate
remedy for custodial parents desperately in need of prompt arrearage collection
to support their children. Since the lien itself, regardless of what kind of
property is involved, is nothing more than a cloud on the obligor's title, the
custodial parent is forced to wait for the obligor to transfer the property. 49
Meanwhile, the delinquent obligor enjoys its use.
The CSEA requirement that the states provide methods enabling custodial
parents to obtain securities, bonds, or other guarantees of arrearage payment can
be quite effective. '" However, such guarantees are only preventative.''
If the custodial parent does not incorporate some type of guarantee into the child
support agreement or order at an early stage, then the obligation to pay may
amount to no more than an easily broken promise.5 2 Furthermore, in light
of the high rate of support noncompliance, many bonding companies are
predictably hesitant to sell child support bonds to insure an obligor's compliance
with a support order. "
143. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
144. HoRowrrz, supra note 95, at 71.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(4) (1988).
146. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 93.
147. HoRowrrz, supra note 95, at 85 (listing sheriff fees, storage costs, towing fees,
appraiser's fee, auctioneer's fees, and sale publication and advertising costs).
148. ABA VOL.2, supra note 95, at IM-165-66.
149. See supra note 118. Each day that a support arrearage remains unpaid causes further
injury to the children and custodial parent. See supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
151. LDEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 66.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 87.
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In addition to the procedures outlined above, either a custodial parent or the
state may bring an action against an obligor for contempt, assuming that he can
be located and subjected to jurisdiction."5 ' Historically, the threat of
incarceration for contempt has been an effective tool to "encourage" child
support payment when other methods, like wage garnishment, are of limited use
because the obligor is self-employed, intermittently employed, or fails to report
income. 11 Clearly, however, contempt as a method of arrearage collection
is not without defects."~
154. ELMAN, supra note 55, at 413. Both criminal and civil contempt are available for the
enforcement of child support obligations. Id. The difference between the two actions hinges
primarily on the type of sanction imposed. Id. Ellman explains:
If the defendant is jailed for a definite period of time or ordered to pay a fine (e.g.,
equal to the amount of unpaid support) to the court, this will be considered criminal
contempt, thus triggering all of the constitutional protections afforded criminal
defendants. On the other hand, if the court sentences an obligor to jail with the
condition that he can gain release by paying his debts or suspends the jail sentence on
the condition that he pay the arrearages to the obligee, this will be considered civil
contempt.
Id. In either case, the court must conclude that the obligor was able to pay, knew about the support
order, and intentionally failed to make support payments. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 81. For
a case demonstrating the difference between civil and criminal contempt, see Murray v. Murray, 587
P.2d 1220 (Haw. 1978).
Jailing for contempt in child support cases does not violate state constitutional prohibitions
against "debtor's prisons," because child support is generally held not to be a debt within the
meaning of the prohibitions. Exparte Wilbanks, 722 S.W.2d 221 (Trex. Ct. App. 1986); Marriage
of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1983). Some state constitutions prohibiting debt related
imprisonment explicitly exempt support obligations. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. HI, § 38.
155. ABA VOL.1, supra note 59, at 1-15. No discussion of the effect of jailing on support
compliance is complete without mention of the Michigan study performed by Professor David
Chambers. By analyzing data provided by Michigan Friend of the Court agencies, which are county
agencies charged with various authority to enforce child support, Chambers found that the threat of
jail and actual jailing induced compliance with support orders. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 414.
Chambers concluded that the county's financial burden of jailing was far outweighed by the
collection returns. Id. at 414 (citing DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY-THE
ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT 101 (1979)). Nonetheless, a 1983 revision of Michigan's civil
contempt procedures limited the length of jail sentences and designated jail as the last judicial resort
in nonsupport cases. Id. at 415 (citing MicH. COMP. L. §§ 552.633, 552.637 (1988)).
156. The policy of jailing for nonsupport is subject to criticism on grounds separate from its
effectiveness. Professor Chambers noted that the behavior associated with the relationship between
divorced spouses may be an inappropriate realm for application of criminal sanctions. CHAMBERS,
supra note 155, at 245. Chambers argued that even willful nonsupport should be considered an
intra-family offense, because nonpayment and interference with visitation often reflect an extension
of the pre-existing marital relationship. Id. He explained that the Committee on One-Parent
Families of Britain's Department of Health and Social Security recommended in 1974 that Parliament
prohibit jailing for nonsupport because of the 'emotional stress" of post-divorce relationships and
child support's link to "an intimate personal relationship." Id. (citing 1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON ONE-PARENT FAMILIES 128-32 (1974)).
Chambers suggested that jailing, and the threat ofjail, may lead men to either abandon their familial
relationships altogether, or reduce the quality of those relationships for both the men and the
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In general, criminal contempt proceedings are rare because prosecutors,
occupied with arguably more pressing concerns, must bring the action.15
Also, when delinquent obligors are brought to court, some judges merely scold
them for not paying"s or, more frequently, permit them to avoid incarceration
by paying less than the full amount of the arrearage.'" Similarly, in civil
contempt proceedings, public attorneys often fail to prove the obligor's ability
to pay because they are unable to devote the time and resources necessary to
investigate the obligor's finances." Even assuming that the delinquent
obligor can be successfully prosecuted, imprisonment as a method of arrearage
collection may, from the custodial parent's viewpoint, seem counter-productive.
Custodial parents may fear that the obligor will lose his job as a result of the
conviction or will simply flee the jurisdiction upon release. 6' In either event,
the obligor's propensity to make regular child support payments in the future
would likely decrease.
Although the existing procedures for collecting child support are clearly
imperfect, it would seem that collectively they form an impossible barrier to the
obligor's ability to avoid paying support. What then, explains the massive
failure to collect child support?"s Much of the difficulty stems from the fact
that a child support order requires a series of acts over an extended period of
children. Id. at 251-52.
In addition to these criticisms, contempt proceedings may be prone to judicial misuse. Many
states have conducted delinquent obligor roundups. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 415. In Florida,
for example, nearly 500 civil contempt actions were simultaneously assembled before a single judge
who disposed of them in four days. Id. (citing Robbins v. Robbins, 429 So. 2d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983)). Over $140,000 was collected during this proceeding. Id. Over 100 individuals were
found in contempt and inmediately jailed. Id. Thirty-eight of these convictions were overturned
on appeal as violative of due process in light of a "total absence of oaths, court reporters, witnesses,
and rules of evidence." Id.
157. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 80.
158. ABA VOL.2, supra note 95, at 111-166. In one instance, a woman reported taking her ex-
husband to court 30 times for non-payment of child support before he was finally sent to prison. Id.
Ironically, the woman's husband was a policeman. Id.
159. CHAMBERS, supra note 155, at 192. Obligors who lose a civil contempt proceeding
essentially have the "keys to the jailhouse" because they can purchase their release. See supra note
154 and accompanying text. Release, however, is often granted when the arrearage is reduced to
the court's satisfaction, rather than eliminated. CHAMBERS, supra note 155, at 192.
160. ABA VOL.2, supra note 95, at 11-166.
161. Men do, in fact, move away upon release from jail, and they may even leave the area
because of the threat of jail. CHAMBERS, supra note 155, at 251.
162. It should be noted that many women simply do not seek support collection. ELLMAN,
supra note 55, at 403. Many women conclude that a support suit would be futile in light of the
father's attitude or lack of financial resources. Id. Although these mothers may, to some extent,
be justified in failing to pursue a support order, the decision is not theirs to make. Id. The mothers
are failing to enforce the rights of their children. Id.
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time. " Obviously the risk of noncompliance is greater when compliance
requires multiple, periodic payments.'" Also, obligors and their assets are
often difficult to locate." Some obligors are simply unable to pay due to
unemployment, imprisonment, or disability.'" Other obligors lose motivation
to pay for noneconomic reasons, including their psychological intactness,"
their ex-wives' economic status,' the presence of step-children or the birth
of natural children upon the obligor's remarriage," 6 and the infrequency and
inadequacy of their child visitation time.'70
In addition to the father's failure to provide support, many mothers do not
seek enforcement once an arrearage occurs.'7 ' These women are often
emotionally deterred from pursuing a judgment because they dread future contact
with their ex-husbands."7  Also, although inexpensive methods of child
support enforcement exist, " many women are unaware of the alternatives to
private counsel or the possibility for recovery of attorney fees. 74 In sum,
these women, who often have little time and even less money, feel intimidated
by the thought of initiating legal action and often believe that their chances for
successful collection are low. " Unfortunately, if a woman's ex-husband has
remarried and placed his assets in a tenancy by the entirety with his new spouse,
her fears of wasting time, effort, and money in an attempt to obtain her
163. ELLmAN, supra note 55, at 404.
164. Id.
165. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 133, 136-37.
.166. McLaughlin, supra note 72, at 428.
167. L.E ERMAN, supra note 39, at 16-17. Judith Wallerstein and Dorothy Huntington of the
Center for the Family in Transition at Corte Madera, California conducted a study from 1971 to
1977 on the reasons for nonsupport. Id. at 15 (citing J. WALLERSTEIN & D. HUNTiNroN, THE
PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBUGATION (Judith Casetty ed., 1983)). The study showed a high
incidence of alcoholism and "disabling psychological dysfunction* among fathers who failed to fulfill
their support obligations. Id. at 16.
168. While the custodial mother's economic difficulties do not seem to prompt the obligor to
comply with the support order, the mother's financial success seems to greatly reduce the obligor's
incentive to pay. IEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 17.
169. While remarriage seems to have little effect on the rate of an obligor's compliance with
the support order, he clearly pays less to his children from his first marriage if he remarries and
supports another set of children. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 17.
170. Fathers who have regular, satisfactory visits with their children are much more likely to
continue to pay child support over long periods of time. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 17.
171. ELLIMAN, supra note 55, at 404.
172. Id.
173. Through IV-D agencies, the wage withholding procedure, see supra note 115 and
accompanying text, state income tax intercept programs, see supra note 116 and accompanying text,
and federal income tax offset programs, see supra note 117 and accompanying text, are all relatively
inexpensive and often effective collection techniques.
174. Badertscher, supra note 59, at 309.
175. ELLMAN, supra note 55, at 404.
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children's support may be absolutely justified. In many of the states that still
recognize the concept, 76 the entireties method of property ownership provides
the obligor with a simple and effective vehicle for avoiding his child support
obligation.
IV. THE TENANCY BY THE ENTETY METHOD OF ESCAPE
A. History of the Tenancy by the Entirety
The precise origin of the tenancy by the entirety is unknown.'" It
developed as part of the English feudal system of land tenures that permitted
only male ownership of property." Under this system, a woman's already
insignificant legal identity was merged into her husband's upon marriage."
The legal fiction of marital unity, where man and woman were considered one
person,'8°  made true concurrent ownership of property conceptually
impossible,"' thus creating the need for the tenancy by the entirety. At early
common law, any property brought into the marriage by the wife, transferred
during marriage to either spouse, or transferred during marriage to both husband
and wife was held by the fictional "entirety."" A valid tenancy by the
entirety was created in each of these instances because the transfer satisfied the
unities of "time," "title," "interest," "possession," and the additional unity of
176. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
177. RICIARD R. POWELL, 4A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 620.3 (Richard R. Powell &
Patrick J. Rohan eds., Bender 1993). The tenancy was recognized by both Littleton and Blackstone.
See THOMAS LrrrLHON, LUrLTON'S TENURES § 291; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*182.
178. Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEmPLE L.Q. 24 (1951).
179. Id. Not only did the wife's legal identity cease to exist upon marriage, her personal
property was generally considered to be owned by her husband. William G. Craig, Jr., An Analysis
of Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 255, 259 (1974). Since marriage
amounted to an absolute gift of the wife's personalty to her husband, there was no function for the
tenancy by the entirety in personal property. Id. See also 2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1378, 1402 (Arno Press photo. reprint 1972) (1836).
180. Because of the male dominated society of the early common law, the metaphysical entity
which represented the marital unit of husband and wife was clearly a masculine creature. Nearly
200 years ago, Blackstone wrote: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover,
she performs everything .... " 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 (citations omitted).
181. POWELL, supra note 177, 620.3.
182. Phipps, supra note 178, at 24; Jane Harper Porter, Comment, Real Properry-Tenancy
by the Entirety in North Carolina: An Idea Whose Tme Has Gone?, 58 N.C. L. REv. 997, 998
(1980); POWELL, supra note 177, 620.3.
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"person" resulting from marriage."in
Because the marital unit was the owner of the entireties estate, both spouses
were considered seized' of the entire ownership interest in the property,
rather than merely possessing an undivided fractional interest, as with tenancy
in common.'" The most important incident or ownership characteristic of the
183. POWEL, supra note 177, 620.1. At common law, one spouse could not convey
property to himself and his spouse to create a tenancy by the entirety because the transfer would not
satisfy the unity of time requirement for creation of the estate. Id. 621.5; Craig, supra note 179,
at 257. The unity of time requirement meant that the tenants' interests in the property must vest
simultaneously. JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY
109 (3d ed. 1989). Unity of title was met when the tenants took their interests by the same deed,
will, or other instrument. Id. Unity of interest was met when the tenants held estates of the same
type and duration. Id. Unity of possession was met when the tenants held undivided interests in
the whole of the property, rather than a divided interest in distinct parts of the estate. Id.
184. "Seized" is defined as the status of legal ownership and possessionof real estate. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1359 (6th ed. 1990).
185. Rodger A. Heaton, Note, Administration of Entireties Property in Bankruptcy, 60 IND.
L.J. 305, 305 (1985). A tenant by the entirety is 'deemed to be seized of the whole [estate], and
not of a moiety or any undivided portion thereof." Melissa H. Hill, Survey of Developments in
North Carolina Law, 1985: XI, Property Law: Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Wright-Crediror's
Rights to Enireties Property Awarded to Nondebtor Spouse Upon Divorce, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1471,
1474 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Bass, 124 S.E. 566, 568 (N.C. 1924)).
The tenancy by the entirety is functionally similar to the joint tenancy. Eric G. Zajac,
Tenancies by the Entirety and Federal Civil Forfeiture Under the Crime Abuse Prevention and
Control Act: A Clash of itans, 54 U. Prmr. L. REv. 553, 578 (1993). Both estates can be created
only by deed or will, and do not arise from interests acquired by intestate succession or adverse
possession. Phipps, supra note 178, at 36. Like the tenancy by the entirety, the joint tenancy's
right to survivorship is its centerpiece. Zajac, supra, at 578. Under the survivorship concept, when
a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety dies, his or her interest is extinguished and the deceased's
heirs take nothing. Id. Correspondingly, the survivors of the estates take nothing new since each
already owned an interest in the whole of the property. Id. Both estates require the four unities of
time, title, possession, and interest. Id. The tenancy by the entirety, however, requires the
additional unity of person, satisfied by marriage. Id. An important distinction between the estates
is the joint tenant's ability to unilaterally convey his or her interest without the consent of the other
joint tenants. Id. Since the grantee of such a conveyance does not have unity of time or title with
the remaining joint tenants, he or she holds title with respect to those tenants as a tenant in common.
Id. This type of unilateral conveyance is not permitted with the tenancy by the entirety. Id.
A tenancy in common is markedly different from both the joint tenancy and the tenancy by
the entirety. Id. at 579. The only unity required to create a tenancy in common is the unity of
possession. Id. Tenants in common do not enjoy a survivorship right, and their undivided interest
in the estate passes to their heirs upon death. Id. Like joint tenants, however, the tenants in
common can unilaterally convey their interest without the consent of co-owners. Id.
Joint tenants and tenants in common, unlike tenants by the entirety, have the right to seek
partition of the property. Id. This procedure, which varies from state to state, results in either a
sale of the property with the proceeds distributed among the co-tenants, or a physical division of the
land. Id. Tenants by the entirety cannot seek partition, as the procedure would be contrary to the
principle prohibiting unilateral conveyance. Id.
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estate was, and still is, its indestructible right of survivorship."s Unlike the
co-tenants of the other estates, neither spouse could force partition."s  The
right of survivorship was not a contingent future interest" but, rather, it was
presently vested in each spouse.'" At common law, the husband, as manager
of the realty, had the exclusive right to control, use, and possess the property,
including the right to all rents, income, and profits, subject only to the wife's
right of survivorship.W
The genesis of the tenancy by the entirety was, therefore, a result of legal
necessity; it resolved the tension between the need for marital co-ownership and
the presumed incapacity of women to hold property,' by creating a
metaphysical third party, the marital unit, to hold title to the couple's
property."9 In other words, the tenancy by the entirety was justified in part
because women, like infants or the mentally ill, were considered legally
incompetent.'"3 The husband's exclusive right to use and control of the estate
was further justified because the husband almost always provided the funds for
186. Craig, supra note 179, at 256. Estates by the entirety, like joint tenancies, are not
considered part of the decedent's estate for distribution. Batts, supra note 37, at 1262. This is
because sole tide is passed to the surviving spouse by operation of law upon d.ath of the other
spouse. Id.
187. Craig, supra note 179, at 256. At common law, a tenancy by the entireties could be
terminated only by the death of a spouse. Phipps, supra note 178, at 25. Termination by divorce
was theoretically possible, but divorce was exceedingly rare. JOHN E. CRIBBET Er AL., CASES AND
MATERIALs ON PROPERTY 328 (1990); Porter, supra note 182, at 998. However, today the estate
does terminate upon divorce. See infra note 212.
188. A contingent future interest in property is an interest or right to property that becomes
effective upon the happening of an event in the future which may or may not occur. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 321 (6th ed. 1990).
189. Id. One result of this characteristic was that upon the death of one spouse, the surviving
spouse took nothing new in terms of property ownership. Phipps, supra note 178, at 25. Since,
conceptually, both spouses owned the entire estate prior to its termination, the death of one spouse
did not result in a transfer of property. Id.
190. Hill, supra note 185, at 1471. The husband's present enjoyment of the land was limited
only by the inability to alienate or encumber the fee. Id. See also Phipps, supra note 178, at 27.
The husband's exclusive control and possession has been the subject of constitutional challenge.
See, e.g., D'Ercole v. D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Mass. 1976); Robinson v. Trousdale
County, 516 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1974).
191. See D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp. at 1383.
192. POWELI, supra note 177, 1 620.3.
193. The common law of property afforded women, as property of their fathers or husbands,
the same status as children and mental incompetents. Lucinda M. Finley, Choice and Freedom:
Elusive Issues In the Search for Gender Justice, 96 YALE LJ. 914, 934-35 (1987) (book review).
For a description of the treatment of women by the common law of property, see Diane Polan,
Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 294 (David Kairys ed., 1982);
Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of
Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra, at 117.
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the purchase."
Today, some argue that the motivation behind using tenancy by the entirety
is purely emotional.1 However, the primary reason for the survival of the
estate seems to be a desire to financially protect the marital unit.'" The
indestructible right of survivorship and the inalienability of the estate
accomplishes this protection by rendering the tenancy inviolable to the actions
of individual spouses or third parties.'" Society affords this benefit to the
marital unit because of its high regard for family life" and the public values
derived from the institution of marriage.'" In this regard, the tenancy by the
entirety performs much the same function as statutory homestead
exemptions." °
194. Porter, supra note 182, at 1003.
195. It is thought that spouses may desire to hold entireties property 'simply to promote
subjective impressions of unification, of companionship, and of economic interdependency." Phipps,
supra note 178, at 45.
196. See Heaton, supra note 185, at 318; Phipps, supra note 178, at 41. As articulated by a
Pennsylvania judge:
Husband and wife own an estate in entireties as if it were a living tree, whose fruits they
share together. To split the tree in two would be to kill it and then it would not be what
it was before when either could enjoy its shelter, shade and fruit as much as the other.
Sterrett v. Sterrett, 166 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 1960). This colorful description of the marital unit seems
to be a clear result of the religious and "ancient mysticism of the marriage sacrament, embodying
the avowal that the two were indissolubly joined as one flesh .... " CRIBBEr, supra note 183, at
328.
197. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
198. Hill, supra note 185, at 1483.
199. Phipps, supra note 178, at 41.
200. Homestead laws originated in an 1839 statute of the Republic of Texas. Edward N.
David, Note, Ignoring State Homestead Laws: Satisfying Federal Tar Liens Through The Sales of
Homestead Property, 60 CHI.-KEN'r L. REv. 683, 692 (1984) (citing AcT ON JAN. 26, 1839, ART.
684, 1839 LAWS OF THE REPJBUC OF TEXAS, 3d Cong., 1st Sess. 113). Generally, homestead
property is considered an "artificial estate in land, devised to protect the possession and enjoyment
of the owner against the claims of his creditors, by withdrawing the property from execution and
forced sale, so long as the land is occupied as a home." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 734 (6th ed.
1990). The purpose of the homestead exemption is to give debtors a stable place of abode by
placing their home, sometimes to a set statutory amount, outside the reach of their creditors. Denzer
v. Prendergast, 126 N.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Minn. 1964). The exemption is intended to promote
family security by protecting the family from financial destitution. David, supra, at 685. Like the
tenancy by the entirety, homestead exemption statutes restrict an individual spouse's ability to incur
obligations to the detriment of the other spouse. Ross, supra note 77, at 118. These statutes
prohibit spouses with sole title to homestead property from unilaterally alienating or encumbering
it. Id.
Obviously, the policy behind the homestead exemption is in conflict with creditor's rights in
bankruptcy because its protection of the homestead is accomplished by exempting the property from
attachment, judgment levies, and sales for the payment of debts incurred by the owner. David,
supra, at 685. This same conflict is presented by the tenancy by the entirety. Heaton, supra note
185, at 319. See infra text accompanying notes 222-38.
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B. Modern Treatment of the Tenancy by the Entirety
The tenancy by the entirety has run the gauntlet of common law and
statutory modification." 1 The estate was abolished in England in 1925 with
the Law of Property Act.202 As society and the law has evolved, the tenancy
by the entirety has been rejected in the United States as repugnant to common
law,' inconsistent with community property systems,' and inconsistent
with adaptations of the Uniform Marital Property Act.' 0  As a result, the
present status of the tenancy by the entirety is extremely varied among the
states. 2D6
201. The estate has, however, to a large extent survived. It is estimated that as much as two-
thirds of all residential property is purchased in joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety. Mary
Moers Wenig, The Maritl Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Presem and Future, 1990 Wis. L.
REv. 807, 862.
202. Craig, supra note 179, at 257 (citing C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 230 (1962)).
203. ROGER CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.5, at 211 (1984). Marriage
has little effect on property rights in states that use a common law title system. Ross, supra note
77, at 114. Under common law title systems, both spouses own and manage the property to which
they hold title individually. Id.
204. Community property states typically afford equal property ownership rights to women.
Hill, supra note 185, at 1474. In these jurisdictions, the state grants rights to spouses who hold no
title to the marital property. Olidge, supra note 77, at 888. As of 1992, only eight community
property states existed. Id. (listing Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, and Washington). Typically, only property acquired after marriage, excluding property
acquired by a single spouse by gift or inheritance, is considered marital property in these states.
Parkinson, supra note 50, at 677.
In addition to sharing ownership of the marital property, however, under most community
property systems, spouses share debts. Ross, supra note 77, at 119. Therefore, the community
property of a married couple may become liable for a single spouse's debt. Id. Clearly, this
fundamental aspect of community liability runs counter to the tenancy by the entirety's prohibition
of a spouse's unilateral encumbrance of the entireties estate. Parkinson, supra note 50, at 715.
205. The concept of male personification of the marital unit made the tenancy by the entirety
an obvious target for reform as the United States began to recognize property rights in women.
POWELL, supra note 177, 620.3. The recognition of property rights in women began in the early
19th century. See infra note 220.
The Uniform Marital Property Act (the Act) was passed by the Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws in July, 1983 and has had a profound effect on American marital property law. UNIF.
MARrrAL PROP. ACT, 9A U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1986), cited in Parkinson, supra note 50, at 678. The
Act proposed that the interests of all property acquired after the "determination date" vest jointly
and equally in each spouse. Parkinson, supra note 50, at 678. The "determination date' is either
the date of marriage, the date when the Act becomes effective, or the date of domicile in the
enacting state, whichever is later. Id. Although ownership is shared equally under the Act, unlike
most community property and common law title systems, management and control of the property
belongs to the spouse who holds legal title. Id. The Act, and similar state statutes, removes the
common law disabilities of married women and destroys the legal fiction of marital unity. Hill,
supra note 185, at 1474. Therefore, some courts have reasoned, the entireties concept has been
eliminated. Id. See also Craig, supra note 179, at 257.
206. POWEL, supra note 177, 620.4.
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Although estimates of the number of states that recognize the estate are
somewhat inconsistent, property law scholar Richard R. Powell reports that the
tenancy by the entirety is affirmatively recognized by twenty-five states and the
District of Columbia.27 Another five states make statutory mention of the
207. Id. The jurisdictions that recognize tenancy by the entirety are as follows:
Alaska: Recognized by statute. ALASKA STAT. § 34.15.140(a)(1990).
Arkansas: Mentioned in several concurrent ownership statutes. ARK. CODE ANN. §§
9-12-315, 9-12-317, 18-13-113, 28-10-103 (1993).
Delaware: Recognized by statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 703 (1953).
D.C.: Explicitly recognized in several code provisions. D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-
201 (1993 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-216, 45-1705, 45-1803
(1990 & Supp. 1994).
Florida: Recognized by statute. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.11 (West 1969 & Supp.
1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 708.10 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
Hawaii: Recognized by statute, but explicit intent to create tenancy by the entirety
is required to overcome presumption of tenancy in common. HAW. REV.
STAT. § 509-1, 509-2 (1985).
Indiana: Presumed by statute o be created by all conveyances to husband and wife.
IND. CODE § 32-1-2-6 (1979 & Supp. 1994).
Kentucky: Mentioned incidentally in tax and simultaneous death statutes. KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 397.030 (Michie 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.050
(Michie 1994).
Maryland: Recognized by statute. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-802
(1989); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 4-108 (1994).
Massachusets: Recognized by statute, but explicit intent to create tenancy by the entirety
is required to overcome presumption of tenancy in common. MASS. ANN.
LAWS, ch. 184, § 7 (West 1991). Conveyance to married couple as joint
tenants creates a tenancy by the entirety. Id. § 8.
Michigan: Recognized by statute. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 557.81, 557.101
(West 1988).
Mississippi: Recognized by recent case law. Ayres v. Petro, 417 So. 2d 912 (Miss.
1982); Cuevas v. Cuevas, 191 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1966).
Missouri: Recognized by statute. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.025 (Vernon 1986).
Montana: Recognized by case law. Clark v. Clark, 387 P.2d 907 (Mont. 1963).
New Jersey: Recognized by statute. N J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-18 (West 1968 & Supp.
1994).
New Yor*- Recognized by statute. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240-b (McKinney 1989).
North Carolina: Recognized by statute. N C. GEN. STAT. §§ 39-13.3, 39-13.5, 39-13.6
(1984 & Supp. 1994).
Ohio: Recognized by statute. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5302.17 (Anderson
1986). However, tenancy by the entirety was criticized as anachronistic
prior to enactment of § 5302.17. Wilson v. Fleming, 13 Ohio 68 (1844);
Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305 (1826).
Oklahoma: Recognized by statute. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 74 (West 1971 &
Supp. 1994).
Oregon: Recognized by statute. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.020, 91.030, 108.090
(1990).
Pennsylvania: Recognized by statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 541 (1994).
Rhode Island: Recognized by case law. Bloomfield v. Brown, 25 A.2d 354 (R.I. 1942).
Tennessee: Recognized by statute. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-109 (1993).
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tenancy by the entirety, but neither approve nor restrict its use.2 Only
thirteen states clearly reject the tenancy by the entirety.' The remaining
seven states have taken either an unclear position or no position at all."' Of
these seven states, all but Louisiana have adopted common law rules of decision,
thus supporting the inference that they would recognize the tenancy by the
entirety. 2
1
The states that still recognize the tenancy by the entirety have altered its
common law characteristics to varying degrees. A valid marriage, however,
remains a firm requirement. 2  The indestructible right to survivorship still
exists. 2 3  As a result, neither the husband nor the wife can unilaterally
partition or convey the entireties property.1 4 The presumption that any
conveyance to a married couple creates a tenancy by the entirety has also
survived in many states.2s Of the twenty-six jurisdictions that recognize the
Vermont: Recognized by case law. Buzzell v. Edward H. Everett Co., 180 F. Supp.
893 (D. Vt. 1960).
Virginia: Recognized by case law. In re Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973);
Vasilion v. Vasilion, 66 S.E.2d 599 (Va. 1951).
Wyoming: Recognized by statute. WYO. STAT. § 34-1-140 (1994).
208. The five states that mention tenancy by the entirety in their legislative codes are Arizona,
Georgia, Kansas, Nebraska, and Utah. Id.
209. The thirteen states that have abolished tenancy by the entirety are California, Connecticut,
Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
210. Id.
211. POWELL, supra note 177, 1 620.4.
212. Id. 621.1. In the majority of states that still recognize tenancy by the entirety, divorce,
since it destroys the essential unity of person, converts the estate into a tenancy in common. Hill,
supra note 185, at 1474. Therefore, the tenants become owners of an undivided one-half interest
in the property. Id. at 1475; see also Phipps, supra note 178, at 35.
213. POWELL, supra note 177, 622.1.
214. Id. At common law, the husband had exclusive control over the entireties property and
could convey or encumber it without his wife's consent. Id. 622.2
215. Id. 621.2. These jurisdictions include Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island. Id. The common law requirement of unity of time, which required a "strawman"
conveyance to create the estate from property previously held solely by one spouse, has been
abolished by statute or decision in many states. Id. 621.5. "Strawman" refers to any individual
other than one of the spouses. The "strawman" conveyance occurred as follows: X holds title to
property. X marries Y and wishes to hold title to the property as tenants by the entirety with Y. X
conveys the property to Z (the "strawman") who has agreed to convey the property back to X and
Y as tenants by the entirety. The result of this strange formality is that X and Y take title to the
property simultaneously, thus satisfying the unity of time requirement for creation of a valid tenancy
by the entirety. Creation of a tenancy by the entirety by direct conveyance of one spouse is
permitted in Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. Id.
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tenancy by the entirety,1 6 only five have retained the common law rule of
prohibiting the estate in personalty.2"7 Unlike the common law tenancy by the
entirety, the modem estate can end in various ways, including divorce."" A
significant difference between the common law tenancy by the entirety and the
modem estate is the abolition of the husband's exclusive right to control.
219
The enactment of married women's property acts has resulted in equal rights for
tenants by the entirety.'
C. Creditors' Ability to Reach Tenancy by the Entirety Property
While the mutual control characteristic of the modem tenancy by the
entirety makes it much less offensive to our sense of fairness, the shift from
exclusive male control has had a significant adverse effect on creditors. "
Prior to the advent of mutual control, creditors were sometimes able to
encumber the husband's income interest or survivorship interest in the
tenancy.'m Today, mutual control, combined with the tenants' inability to
unilaterally encumber the property, removes both spouses' interests from the
reach of either spouse's creditors in many states.m Other states permit one
216. The jurisdictions include 25 states and the District of Columbia. See supra note 207 and
accompanying text.
217. Id. 621.6. At common law, tenancy by the entirety in personal property was not
possible because the wife's personal property became the property of the husband upon marriage.
Id. The states which do not recognize tenancy by the entirety in personalty are Indiana, Michigan,
New Jersey, New York, and North Carolina. Id.
218. Craig, supra note 179, at 264. An estate by the entirety can terminate when: one or both
spouses die; the spouses divorce or obtain an annulment; one of the spouses becomes permanently
insane or legally incompetent; the spouses agree, either expressly or impliedly, to divide the
proceeds of sale of the estate; one spouse conveys all of his or her interest in the property to the
other spouse; or the estate is equitably converted by an executory contract for sale in states that do
not recognize tenancy by the entirety in personalty. Id.
219. POWELL, supra note 177, 622.2.
220. Id. See generally John D. Johnson, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition,
the Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033 (1972).
Married women's property acts have been enacted in all the common law states and essentially make
the fact of marriage irrelevant, giving both husband and wife rights in property as if the marriage
had not taken place. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-9-2 (Bums 1980); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 404.020(1) (Baldwin 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.02 (West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-3-
1 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-16 (West 1968).
221. POWELL, supra note 177, 622.3.
222. Id.
223. POWELL, supra note 177, 1 622.3. These states are as follows:
Delaware: Mitchell v. Wilmington Trust Co., 449 A.2d 1055 (Del. Ch. 1982).
D.C.: Estate of Wall v. Preston, 440 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Florida: Miller v. Rosenthal, 510 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
Hawaii: Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977).
Indiana: Myler v. Myler, 210 N.E.2d 446 (Ind. App. Ct. 1965).
Maryland: Diamond v. Diamond, 467 A.2d 510 (Md. 1983); Elko v. Elko, 49 A.2d
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spouse's creditors to levy and execute against the property, but the creditor's
interest is subject to the nondebtor spouse's right of survivorship.'M Overall,
twenty of the twenty-six tenancy by the entirety jurisdictions prohibit creditors,
including noncustodial parents seeking to collect a child support arrearage
judgment, from obtaining prompt satisfaction of one spouse's debts. 5
The majority rule is that a creditor of one spouse can levy and execute only
upon whatever property interest that spouse is free to convey, which, in most
states recognizing the tenancy by the entirety, is nothing.' This rule also
applies to child support obligees. A child support arrearage judgment essentially
converts the custodial parent into an unsecured creditor. Therefore, if the
delinquent obligor holds property as tenants by the entirety with a new spouse,
most entirety jurisdictions prohibit the custodial parent from even securing the
441 (Md. 1946).
Michigan: Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971).
Missouri: Wry v. Wade, 814 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Farmer v. Miller,
746 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
North Carolina: Union Grove Milling & Mfg. Co. v. Faw, 406 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. Ct. App.
1991), 436 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. 1993).
Ohio: Wolff v. Kuralak, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 6096 (1991); Central Nat'l Bank
v. Fitzwilliam, 465 N.E.2d 408 (Ohio 1984).
Oregon: Brownlcy v. Lincoln County, 343 P.2d 529 (Or. 1959).
Pennsylvania: Stauffer v. Stauffer, 351 A.2d 236 (Pa. 1976).
Rhode Island: Bloomfield v. Brown, 25 A.2d 354 (R.I. 1942).
Vermont: Lowell v. Lowell, 419 A.2d 321 (Vt. 1980).
Virginia: Hausmanv. Hausman, 353 S.E.2d 710 (Va. 1987).
Wyoming: Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 297 P.2d 213 (Wyo. 1956).
PowELL, supra note 177, 620.4, 622.3. Of course, joint creditors still enjoy access to the
entirety, and tenants cannot remove the property from the reach of individual creditors by creating
an entirety estate with the intent to defraud creditors. Id. 1 622.3.
224. In other words, the creditor cannot force partition. Id. 622.3. The states recognizing
limited access to tenancy by the entirety property are as follows:
Alaska: Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alaska 1960).
Arkansas: Moore v. Denson, 268 S.W. 609 (Ark. 1942).
New Jersey: Freda v. Commercial Trust Co., 570 A.2d 409 (N.J. 1990); Newman v.
Chase, 359 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1976).
New York: V.R.W., Inc. v. Klein, 503 N.E.2d 496 (N.Y. 1986).
POWELL, supra note 177, 622.3.
225. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
226. Hill, supra note 185, at 1475-76. See also Parkinson, supra note 50, at 723 n.201. The
only exception to this rule is found in Massachusetts. See Drury v. Abdallah, 46 B.R. 718, 719 (D.
Mass. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116 (1986) (observing that Massachusetts law permits the
husband-tenant, but not the wife, to convey his interest in the entireties estate and thus, creditors
may attach or levy upon his individual property interest). Sandra Murphy, of the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, explained that holding joint title to marital property is preferred
by most married couples "because at least 24 states . . . have something called 'tenancies by the
entirety' which protects the home from the creditors of either spouse." Andree Brooks, Wedding
Joy, with Separate Checking, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1993, § 1, at 31.
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debt by attaching a lien to the property. 7  In contrast, if that same delinquent
obligor held the property with a new spouse as joint tenants or tenants in
common, most states would permit the custodial parent to attach a lien to the
property, compel partition, and force the sale of the obligor's interest to satisfy
the child support arrearage 2' This "asset shielding" characteristic of the
tenancy by the entirety deprives custodial parents of a much needed avenue of
compelling child support payment.
Critical writings on the tenancy by the entirety concept are not difficult to
find. 9  Commentators primarily attack the estate based on its adverse effect
on individual creditors.? In fact, in 1944 the American Bar Association
recommended that the tenancy by the entirety be abolished because it frustrates
the individual creditors of spouses. 1  Much of this frustration is a result of
the entirety tenant's ability to exempt his or her property from bankruptcy
distribution.21 2 Specifically, when one spouse files for bankruptcy, he or she
may choose between two distinct exemption systems: 3  the exemptions
227. HoRowrrz, supra note 95, at 79, 85. The rules regarding the ability of creditors to levy
upon entireties property vary among the states. Some states permit creditors to levy and execute
upon a spouse's individual interest in the entireties estate. POWELL, supra note 177, 622.3 (listing
Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, New Jersey, and New York). After an execution sale, the purchaser of
the debtor-spouse's interest becomes a tenant in common with the non-debtor spouse, but has no
right to force partition. Id. Oklahoma and Tennessee permit individual creditors to sever the estate
and destroy the right of survivorship to satisfy debts of either spouse. Id. See Gilles v. Norman
Plumbing Supply Co., 549 P.2d 1351 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); James S. Cox & Assocs. v. King,
1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (1992). Furthermore, if the debtor-spouse survives the non-debtor
spouse, a valid lien against the debtor's interest in the estate will become collectible. POWEiL,
supra note 177, 622.3.
228. HoRowITz, supra note 95, at 85. Joint tenants own an undivided portion of the whole
property with equal rights to enjoy its use. Frank J. Spivak, Estates by the Endrery in Bankruptcy,
15 U. MICH J.L. REF. 399, 402 n.17 (1982). Their rights to survivorship are therefore destructible.
Id. Tenants in common own merely a separate fractional interest with their co-tenants. Therefore,
their property interests are freely subject to levy and sale. If the tenancy is destroyed, individual
divided interests are created, thus enabling creditors to levy upon those interests. Id. Under the
majority treatment of the tenancy by the entirety, however, the tenants each own the entire estate,
not merely an undivided interest. Id. Therefore, the estate is indestructible and generally cannot
be reached by creditors. Id.
229. See generally Craig, supra note 179; Zajac, supra note 185; William T. Vukowich,
Debtors'Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REv. 769 (1980); Spivak,
supra note 228; Porter, supra note 182; Phipps, supra note 178.
230. See, e.g., Vukowich, supra note 229; Spivak, supra note 228; Porter, supra note 182;
Craig, supra note 179.
231. ABA SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, REPORT OF THE
COMMITrEE ON CHANGES IN SUBSTANTIVE REAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES 82-83 (1944). See also
Porter, supra note 182, at 1003.
232. See generally Vukowich, supra note 229; Spivak, supra note 228.
233. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), (2) (1988).
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provided by the Bankruptcy Code itself,' or any immunity existing under
state law.' In other words, what constitutes an fiterest in property under the
Bankruptcy Code is governed by state law.' In most states which recognize
the tenancy by the entirety, the debtor-spouse may choose the state law
exemptions and place all of the couple's entireties property beyond the reach of
the debtor-spouse's individual creditors. 237 Again, the special treatment of
entireties assets in bankruptcy is grounded in the philosophy that the "marital
home and the familial benefits of dependent children" deserve protection.'
D. The Effect of the Tenancy by the Entirety on Child Support Collection
While the debtor's protection provided by the tenancy by the entirety is
clearly an aggravating obstacle to creditors in general, it may seem
incomprehensible to a custodial parent who holds a valid judgment for a child
support arrearage, like Julie from this Note's case study.239 Unfortunately, it
is difficult to quantify the frequency with which efforts to collect arrearage
judgments are frustrated by the delinquent obligor's choice to place his assets in
entireties property with a subsequent spouse.? In states where judgment iens
against entireties property are not permitted, many custodial parents and
attorneys are no doubt deterred from even attempting to collect child support
judgments through attachment of the obligor's joint assets." Where the law
is well settled, it is generally not challenged, especially by single parents in
poverty. 2 Furthermore, a change in a jurisdiction's tenancy by the entirety
doctrine may involve at least one level of appeal. Therefore, a mother with two
234. Id. § 522(b)(1).
235. Id. § 552(b)(2).
236. 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1152 (1991) (citing In re Gorski, 85 B.R. 371 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1988)).
237. Spivak, supra note 228, at 400. See generally 9A AM. JuR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1152
(1991); POWELL, supra note 177, 1 622.5. Debtors are prohibited, however, from converting their
non-exempt assets into entireties property on the eve of bankruptcy. Spivak, supra note 228, at 401.
238. POWELL, supra note 177, 622.5. Note, however, that entireties property need not serve
as the marital home. In many states, couples may hold investment property and even personalty by
the entirety. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
240. For an estimate of the annual number of child support arrearage collection attempts that
are frustrated by the tenancy by the entirety, see infra text accompanying notes 244-51.
241. For a list of states that prohibit judgment liens against entireties property for individual
obligations, see supra note 223.
242. This is a common sense observation. If, for decades, a jurisdiction has continued to
sustain a particular doctrine without question, then the chances of a successful challenge to that
doctrine would seem lower than if it had been either recently adopted or the subject of growing
judicial criticism. Clearly, in light of the disproportionate number of custodial parents in poverty
and the costs of litigation, see supra text accompanying notes 70-74, custodial parents as a class
would seem unlikely to pursue a modification to the state's property law where their chances of
success or anticipated recovery are low.
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jobs and six children badly in need of delinquent support payments must not
only be willing to challenge existing property law, but may also need the
extraordinary tenacity of enduring the process of judicial appeal.' 3 The
scenario described above may explain the absence of reported case law on
attempts to proceed against entireties property as a means of child support
collection.
Although the actual number of frustrated support collection efforts is an
elusive figure at best, the possibility of such frustration can be estimated. In the
twenty jurisdictions that prohibit individual creditors from executing on entireties
property,' approximately 16.3 million married couples hold title to property
used as a residence.' Approximately 7.5 million of these couples include at
least one spouse who was previously married.' Approximately 823,000 child
support obligors are married to a subsequent spouse and have some child support
243. Studies of general civil litigation show that, at the trial court level, roughly 50% of all
plaintiffs lose. Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, 7he Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study
of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 199, 274 (1990). Certainly, if a custodial parent loses at the trial court, the prospect
of the time, tears, cost, and sometimes low anticipated recovery, will serve as a deterrent to an
appeal. For representative studies of successful judicial challenges in general, see KRISTIN
BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 25-32 (1988);
GEORGE R. LANOUE & BARBARA A. LEE, ACADEMICS IN COURT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
FACULTY DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 34-40 (1987). Even if the custodial parent is successful at
trial, the possibility that the obligor will appeal the decision is always present.
244. See supra notes 223-24.
245. This estimate is based on 1992 data and was calculated as follows: 82,200,000 persons
in the United States were married and held title to property used as a residence in 1992. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: HOUSEHOLD &
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 1992, No. 467 (1992) (reporting 41.1 million couples). Using a total
United States population of 248,779,873, see BOOK OF STATES, supra note 81, 33.04% of all people
in the United States were married and held title to property used as a residence
((82,200,0001248,779,873)(100) = 33.04). The 20 states that prohibit individual creditors from
executing on entireties property (TBE states) have a total population of 98,395,515. Id. Assuming
that state of residence has no effect on the percentage of married persons holding title to property
as a residence with respect to the total population, 32,511,116 people in the United States were
married, held title to property used as a residence, and lived in a TBE state ((98,395,515)(0.3304)
= 32,511,116). Therefore, since these people must have been married to each other, 32,511,116
represents 16,255,558 married couples ((32,511,116)/(2) = 16,255,558).
246. In 1988,45.9% of all marriages were not the first marriage for at least one of the spouses.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1993, at 100, table 141 (1993) [hereinafter ABSTRACT 1993]. This calculation assumes
that the 1988 remarriage rate is representative of the current number of couples that consist of at
least one spouse who had been previously married, and who reside in states that prohibit individual
creditors from executing on entireties property (TBE states). This calculation further assumes that
this class of couples is as likely to hold title to property used as a residence as couples consisting
of first time brides and grooms. Under these assumptions, 7,461,301 married couples hold title to
property used as a residence, live in a TBE state, and include at least one spouse who had previously
been married ((16,255,558, see supra note 245) (0.459) = 7,461,301).
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arrearage. 7  This number of delinquent, remained obligors constitutes
approximately 3.54 % of all couples comprised of at least one spouse who was
previously married.' Assuming this 3.54% applies to the 7.5 million
married couples who (1) hold title to residential property, (2) include at least one
spouse who had previously been married, and (3) live in one of the twenty
jurisdictions described above, 9 then approximately 264,000 obligors live in
one of these twenty jurisdictions, hold title to residential property, are
remarried, and have some arrearage. 's All of these delinquent obligors either
hold their property as tenants by the entirety, or are in a position to convert their
property to a tenancy by the entirety. 25' As a result, approximately 264,000
individuals who have broken the law by failing to support their children are
capable of legally removing their assets from the reach of collection pursuant to
247. This figure is based on 1989 data, and incorporates two assumptions. First, obligors are
as likely to remarry as are obligees. Actually, men remarry at a slightly higher rate than women.
See ABTRAc 1993, supra note 246, at 100, table 141. Second, an obligor's marital status has an
insignificant effect on his propensity to pay child support. Remarriage, alone, has been shown to
have either no effect, or a slightly positive effect, on an obligor's propensity to pay child support.
Batts, supra note 37, at 1250 (citing studies reported in Raymond I. Parnas & Sherry Cermak,
Rethinking Child Support, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 759, 766 (1989)). However, if children result
from the subsequent marriage, reduced payments to the prior family often result. Id.
Using these assumptions, the number of remarried obligors who failed to make full payments
was calculated as follows: In 1989, 48.86% of all obligors failed to make full child support
payments. ABsTRAcT 1993, supra note 246, at 385, table 611. Approximately 1,685,000 obligees
were married to a subsequent spouse in 1989. Id. at table 612. Under the first assumption,
therefore, 1,685,000 obligors were married to a subsequent spouse in 1989. Under the second
assumption, 823,291 obligors were married to a subsequent spouse and failed to make full child
support payments ((0.4886)(1,685,000) = 823,291). This calculation further assumes that none of
these obligors were married to each other.
248. This figure is based on 1990 data. In 1990, the number of married couples living in the
United States was 50,708,000. ABsTRAcT 1993, supra note 246, at 58, table 69. Using the
remarriage rate of 45.9% (and the assumption explained in supra note 247), 23,274,972 of all
married couples in the United States included at least one spouse who had previously been married
((50,708,000)(0.459) = 23,274,972). The figure of 823,291 (rounded to 823,000 in supra text
accompanying note 248) constitutes 3.54% of the 23,274,972 married couples in the United States
that included at least one spouse who had previously been married ((823,291)/(23,274,972) (100)
= 3.54).
249. This assumption asserts that no relationship exists between a remarried obligor's propensity
to pay support, his state of residence, or his ability to hold title to property used as a residence.
250. 7,461,301 (rounded to 7.5 million in supra note 246 and accompanying text) multiplied
by 0.0354 equals 264,130 (rounded to 264,000 in text).
251. Not all married couples who hold title to property in jurisdictions that recognize tenancy
by the entirety take advantage of that form of concurrent ownership. It follows that not all of these
264,000 obligors hold tenancy by the entirety property. However, some states presume that all
married couples take title to property as tenants by the entirety, unless a contrary intent is clearly
indicated. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the estimate of 264,000
remarried, delinquent obligors living in tenancy by the entirety jurisdictions does not include
obligors who hold investment property or personal property as tenants by the entirety with a
subsequent spouse. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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a valid arrearage judgment against them.
While some of these obligors may eventually be forced to pay their
arrearage through alternate collection methods, their children will nonetheless
go without that money temporarily while the obligors enjoy its use. 2 In light
of the devastating effects of nonsupport on both children and custodial parents
and the tremendous effort and expense devoted by the government to ensure
effective collection techniques, not even a single child should be denied support
by the anachronistic incidents 3 of the tenancy by the entirety. If one
obligation exists to which the entireties estate's creditor protection characteristic
should yield, it is the obligation to support one's children.
254
However, creating any exception to the insulation provided by the entireties
estate runs headlong into the policy most commonly raised to defend
it-protection of the family home.' In this regard, the tenancy by the
entirety is functionally equivalent to statutory homestead exemptions existing in
most states.' Homestead exemptions represent "a policy decision designed
to give protection to the family unit by granting a certain exemption to the head
of a family against the claims of creditors."' 7  The privilege is usually
claimed by married couples.' - Since the policy of family financial protection
is common to both the homestead exemption and the tenancy by the entirety, it
is instructive to examine the instances in which the policy of the former can be
defeated. An interesting example, provided by the IRS, is examined in the next
section.
V. POLICIES COMPETING WIH FAMILY ASSET PROTECTION
A. Federal Tax Collection
The obligation to pay taxes, like death, is unavoidable. Furthermore, little
property, personal or real, is exempt when the IRS seeks collection of unpaid
taxes. 9 The justification for the IRS's virtually unlimited ability to recover
252. See supra text accompanying notes 56-74.
253. Specifically, the fiction of property ownership by the marital unit coupled with the
indestructible right of survivorship.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 37-55.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 196-99.
256. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
257. CRaBBET, supra note 183, at 92.
258. Id. at 93.
259. IRS code § 6334 exempts nine types of pioperty from administrative levy to enforce a
federal tax lien. David, supra note 200, at 687. Those properties include the following: (1)
necessary clothes and school books; (2) personal household items like fuel, furniture, livestock,
poultry, and arms not exceeding $1500 in value; (3) books and tools needed to perform a trade not
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delinquent taxes is predictably financial. At the end of fiscal year 1984, the
amount of delinquent taxes owed the Treasury totaled $29.4 billion . ' With
its obvious financial commitments and a growing federal deficit,"' the
government has placed tremendous pressure on the IRS to collect every dollar
of unpaid taxes.' If a taxpayer fails to pay any tax within ten days after the
IRS provides notice and demand, Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) creates a lien for the unpaid amount plus any interest and civil penalties
in favor of the United States "upon all property and rights to property . . .
belonging to such person."' One of the Service's primary collection tools
exceeding $1000 in value; (4) federal or state unemployment benefits; (5) undelivered mail; (6)
"[a]nnuity or pension payments under the Railroad Retirement Act, benefits under the Railroad
Unemployment Insurance Act, special pension payments received by a person whose name has been
entered on the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard Medal of Honor roll (38 U.S.C. 562), and
annuities based on retired or retainer pay under chapter 73 of title 10 of the United States Code";
(7) federal or state workers' compensation benefits; (8) child support judgments entered prior to the
date of tax levy; and (9) a minimum amount of wages. I.R.C. § 6334(a)(l)-(a)(9) (1994).
260. TREASURY, POSTAL SERvIcE, AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR FiscAL
YEAR 1986: HEARINGS ON H.R. 3036 BEFORE A SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
APPROPRIATIONS, 99th Cong., 1st Seas. 387 (1985) (statement of Rosco L. Egger, Jr.,
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service). See also Michael J. Young, Levying on Joint Bank
Accounts: A licdng Bomb for the Nondelinquent Joint Account Holder, 70 MINN. L. REv. 1308
(1986).
261. Young, supra note 260, at 1308-09 & n.5 (noting an estimated federal deficit of $167
billion in 1985).
262. Id. at 1308.
263. I.R.C. § 6321 (1994). Section 6321 provides as follows:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or
assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be
a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real
or personal, belonging to such person.
Id. For an in-depth discussion of the operation of § 6321 on joint bank accounts, see Young, supra
note 260. For a critical analysis of the application of federal tax liens to homestead property, see
David, supra note 200.
Three procedural requirements are imposed on the IRS before the tax lien arises. Young,
supra note 260, at 1310. First, the Service must make a tax assessment. I.R.C. § 6201(a) (1994).
Second, it must give the taxpayer notice of the amount of the assessment and demand payment.
I.R.C. § 6303(a) (1994). Finally, the Service must provide a 10-day grace period before the lien
attaches. Young, supra note 260, at 1311. As a practical matter, the grace period is considerably
longer due to delays in the Service's internal procedures. Id. at 1311 n.14. Once these
requirements are met, the lien is perfected and the government takes automatic priority over most
other creditors with an interest in the taxpayer's property. Id. at 1311.
Tax lien priority is governed by § 6323, which accommodates the applicable provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. § 9-301 (1993)), the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 507(a)
(1989)), and state law governing the rights of secured creditors. David, supra note 200, at 690.
Under § 6323, until the Service files the tax lien, good faith purchasers for value, security interest-
holders, entities with mechanic's liens, and judgment lien creditors have priority over the federal tax
lien. Id. at 690 n.72. After the lien is filed, it remains subordinate to 10 classes of creditors. Id.
at 690-91 (citing I.R.C. § 6323(b) (1984)).
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is the lien-foreclosure suit.26
IRC Section 7403, the lien-foreclosure provision, authorizes a judicial sale
of any property in which the delinquent taxpayer has any right, title, or interest
to enforce a federal tax lien. 5 Under this section, the government may bring
a civil action in federal district court to foreclose its tax lien or subject the
delinquent taxpayer's property to the satisfaction of the outstanding tax debt.2
The Supreme Court has interpreted this forced sale provision to permit the
government to obtain satisfaction on its tax lien to the full extent of the debtor's
interest in the subject property.'
In United States v. Rodgers,' the Supreme Court held that IRC Sections
6321 and 7403 permit the sale of homestead property in its entirety, so long as
nondelinquent co-owners of the property receive just compensation for their
interest.20 In so holding, the Court reversed the lower court's holding that
only the portion of the homestead property representing the delinquent
taxpayer's interest could be subject to a forced sale under section 7403.12
The lower court reasoned that since the delinquent taxpayer's widow held a
present interest in the homestead under Texas law, the entire homestead could
not be sold to satisfy the federal tax lien, which attached to her deceased
husband's interest in the property when he failed to pay taxes." The
Supreme Court, while agreeing that a lien under Section 6321 could not extend
beyond the delinquent taxpayer's interest,'m interpreted Section 7403 to permit
a district court to force a sale of the entire subject property, not just the portion
representing the delinquent taxpayer's interest.'
The Court based its conclusion on several grounds. Among them was the
Court's observation that forced sale of the entire property was superior to sale
of only the delinquent taxpayer's interest because it would bring a higher return
for the government.' Furthermore, nondelinquent interest-holders were
264. I.R.C. §§ 7401, 7403 (1994). See Young, supra note 260, at 1312-13. After a tax lien
is perfected, the Service may also collect taxes by administrative levy. I.R.C. § 6331 (1994). See
Young, supra note 260 for a detailed discussion of the application of § 6331 to homestead property.
265. I.R.C. § 7403 (1994).
266. Young, supra note 260, at 1312-13.
267. For a discussion of application of the lien-foreclosure provision to homestead property,
see David, supra note 200.
268. 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
269. Id. at 698.
270. United States v. Rodgers, 649 F.2d 1117, 1123, 1125 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S.
677 (1983).
271. Rodgers, 649 F.2d at 1124-25.
272. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 690-91.
273. Id. at 692-95.
274. Id. at 698.
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protected by the assurance that they would receive just compensation for their
interests and that the government's proceeds from the sale could not exceed the
delinquent taxpayer's proportional interest."S Finally, the Court recognized
that lien-foreclosure was not mandatory and set out guidelines to aid lower
courts in the decision to authorize a forced sale." 6
An important message underlies the IRS's ability to force a sale of an entire
parcel of homestead property to obtain the proceeds representing the delinquent
taxpayer's interest. Despite state law enacted to protect families from financial
ruin, the IRS can sell the family home to collect taxes so long as it reimburses
the nondelinquent interest-holders for their interest in the property."
Therefore, while the IRS is currently unable to defeat the entireties estate's
indestructible incidents,' sit can, in pursuit of delinquent taxes, trump the
remarkably similar policy behind homestead exemptions. This result is
275. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 698 (1983).
276. Id. at 709-11. The Court recognized that there were virtually no circumstances under
which a court could not order a forced sale of homestead property to satisfy a federal tax lien. Id.
at 709. It therefore required consideration of four factors before ordering the sale of property. Id.
at 710-11. First, courts should consider the extent to which the government would be denied
satisfaction if only the delinquent taxpayer's interest in the property was sold. Id. at 710. For
example, if the government would not be able to obtain a fair market price for a portion of the
property by selling that portion alone, then the government's financial interest would be prejudiced.
Id. Second, courts should consider what legally recognized expectations the nondelinquent taxpayer
had in the property under the state law such that a partial interest in it would not be sold. Id. at
710-11. In other words, could a co-owner of the property force partition? Third, courts should
consider the adequacy of the nondelinquent taxpayer's compensation, and the potential relocation
costs those individuals might incur. Id. at 711. Finally, courts should consider the relative
character and nature of the non-delinquent taxpayer's interest in the property. Id. For example, a
forced sale would not be advisable if a non-delinquent taxpayer possessed most of the interest in the
property. Id.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 196-99.
278. In all states except Massachusetts, the government cannot levy on entireties property
because under the "peculiar legal fiction governing tenancies by the entirety .. .no tax lien [can]
attach in the first place because neither spouse possess[es] an independent interest in the property."
Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 703 n.31. See also Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337, 1343 (6th Cir. 1971);
United States v. American Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 255 F.2d 504, 506-07 (5th Cir. 1958); United
States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1951). To determine whether a tax lien can
attach to jointly held property, federal courts look to the applicable state definition of the owners'
rights to the property. Geiselman v. United States, 961 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1992). The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
[I]t has long been the rule that in the application of a federal revenue act, state law
controls in determining the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the
property . .. sought to be reached by the statute. . . . [Section 6321] creates no
property rights but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created
under state law ...."
Tony Thornton Auction Serv., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-14 (1960)). For an example of Section 6321's
application to the tenancy by the entirety under Massachusetts law, see Geiselman, 961 F.2d at 1.
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illustrative of the manner in which a national interest can defeat the policy of
protecting the family home, and it supports the argument that the policy behind
the entireties estate should similarly yield to the need to collect child support
arrearages.
The parallel, however, is not perfect because of the contention that a
homestead is a mere exemption from debts, rather than a true estate.' The
tenancy by the entirety, on the other hand, is clearly a recognized estate.'
Therefore, unlike tax liens as applied to homestead property, this Note's
proposed child support exception to the family protection provided by the
entireties estate conflicts directly with common law property rights."8  This
Note argues that those property rights should be modified to enable custodial
parents to obtain prompt and complete collection of child support
arrearages. 2 2  If adopted, however, this proposed child support exception
would not be the first exception to the traditional incidents of the entireties
estate. One party can already pierce the entireties shield-the United States
government.
B. Drug Forfeiture Laws
Since the Reagan administration's declaration of a war on drugs, Congress
has played an active role in strengthening the government's ability to stem the
tide of illegal drugs flowing into the United States.2  In 1984, Congress
amended the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 19704 to permit
forfeiture of real property used in the commission or facilitation of specified
drug felonies.'85 In addition to President Reagan's policy declaration one year
279. CRIBBEr, supra note 183, at 94. Tiffany contends that the right of an owner to exempt
his or her land from liability for debts does not logically elevate the homestead to the dignity of an
estate. 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1332 (3d. ed. 1939). Therefore, even where a statute labels
the homestead as an estate, the term should be given a new meaning. Id.
280. See supra note 207.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 177-90.
282. See infra text accompanying notes 363-86.
283. For a discussion of President Reagan's plan to address the nation's drug problem, see
Leslie Maitland, President Gives Plan to Combat Drug Networks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1982, at
Al, cited in STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBUC
PoucY 3 (1990).
284. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat.) 1437 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971).
285. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881-904 (1988). The forfeiture provision provides in pertinent part:
(a) Subject property
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right
shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
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earlier, congressional enactment of a potent civil forfeiture provision" was
prompted by the recognition that the traditional penalties of imprisonment and
fines were inadequately addressing the nation's drug crisis.'
The primary shortcoming of the traditional penalties was their failure to
strip criminals and their organizations of power gained through the profits of
illicit activities.' Section 881, the property forfeiture provision of the 1984
Amendment, was designed to address this shortcoming by permitting the seizure
of property, both personal and real, that was connected with the criminals' illicit
activities. 9 Application of the forfeiture provision to entireties property
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements,
which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
286. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
287. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Seas. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3374 ("[Flew in the Congress or the law enforcement community fail to recognize that the
traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the
enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs. . . .).
288. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970)("Congress finds that ...organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money
obtained from such illegal endeavors as. . . the importation and distribution of narcotics and other
dangerous drugs ....").
289. Until very recently, seizure occurred as follows. First, the prosecutor seized the property,
real or personal, pursuant to a warrant of the appropriate district court. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988).
Since civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding, the government must bring suit in the district court
in the jurisdiction where the property is located. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, 193(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3376. The warrant was issued upon the
government's showing of probable cause for the belief that the property was used to traffic drugs,
which could be established using hearsay and circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cit. 1989); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d
618 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. $364,960 in U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981).
After seizure, the burden was on the owner to prove that the property was not used as alleged,
or that it was so used without the owner's knowledge or consent. See, e.g., United States v. 141st
St. Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 876 (2d Cit. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United
States v. 3639 Second St., 869 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1989). The owner's failure to rebut the
government's prima facie showing consummated the forfeiture. See, e.g., 3639 Second St., 869
F.2d at 1095 (stating that a judgment of forfeiture is appropriate where the property owner fails to
rebut the government's prima facie showing of probable cause).
The forfeiture judgment activated the relation-back provision of § 881 (h), which ensures that
the government's interest in the property remains superior to any interest obtained by subsequent
heirs or donees. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) provides: "All right, title, and interest in property described
in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commision of the act giving rise
to forfeiture under this section." 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988) (emphasis added).
Finally, the United States Marshals Service placed the property with a private real estate
broker for public sale, the proceeds of which were distributed pursuant to § 881(e). Damon G.
Saltzburg, Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure
to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L. REv. 217, 228 (1992) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)
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aemonstrates that even deeply rooted property law must sometimes yield to
facilitate urgent national objectives such as the war on drugs. This Note argues
that the national child support crisis provides a similarly compelling justification.
The extent of the property subject to forfeiture under Section 881 is
immense.' Although some courts interpret the extent of property forfeiture
(1988)). Actual distribution depended upon the facts of the case. Regardless of the factual context,
however, § 881(e)(2) authorized the Attorney General to apply the proceeds to, among other things,
the costs of the seizure, maintenance of the property, advertising for the sale, and court costs. 21
U.S.C. § 881(e)(2) (1988). Distribution becomes somewhat complicated, however, when the
individual charged with the drug offense is not the only party with an interest in the forfeited
property. See infra text accompanying notes 295-335.
290. See infra text accompanying notes 292-93. The Supreme Court recently limited the ease
with which the government can seize and sell real property under § 881 of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, a development that was arguably long overdue. The procedure
described in supra note 289 was modified in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114
S. Ct. 492 (1993). Under the prior interpretation of § 881, the government, merely by establishing
probable cause, could seize an alleged offender's residence, evict him, prohibit sale, modify the
property, condition occupancy, receive rents, and "supersede the owner in all rights pertaining to
the use, possession, and enjoyment of the property," all without a hearing. James, 114 S. Ct. at
501. Despite longstanding holdings to the contrary, the Court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment's ex parte warrant requirement did not provide adequate due process protection to
property owners in forfeiture proceedings. Id. at 505. The Court held that, absent certain
circumstances, "the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government in a civil
forfeiture case from seizing real property without first affording the owner notice and an opportunity
to be heard." Id. at 497. Therefore, in light of the decision in James, pre-hearing seizures of real
property under § 881 are apparently a thing of the past.
However, because the Court did not clarify the requisite connection between the property
subject to forfeiture and the underlying crime, it did nothing to change the depth of the statute's bite.
Justice Thomas, dissenting in James, stated that, like the majority, he was "disturbed by the
breadth" of forfeitures permissible under § 881(a)(7). Id. at 515 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing,
as examples of other courts sharing his concern, United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts,
Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992) ("We continue to be enormously troubled by the
government's increasing and virtually unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes.. . ."); United
States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom., Austin v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) ("[W]e are troubled by the government's view that any
property, whether it be a hobo's hovel or the Empire State Building, can be seized by the
government because the owner, regardless of his or her past criminal record, engages in a single
drug transaction.")). Justice Thomas recognized that under § 881(a)(7)'s "immense scope," vast
tracts of land with no real connection to the crime are subject to forfeiture, yet the fiction underlying
in rem forfeiture was "that the thing is primarily considered the offender." James, 114 S. Ct. at
515 (citing J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)) (emphasis
added). Because of the tenuous connection between the current practice and the legal fiction
supporting it, Justice Thomas warned that "it may be nectssary-in an appropriate case-to
reevaluate [the Court's] generally deferential approach to legislative judgments in this area of civil
forfeiture." James, 114 S. Ct. at 515.
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under the statute more narrowly,2' others read Section 881 broadly,
permitting forfeiture of property only remotely related to the alleged crime.?
In United States v. 4492 South Livonia Road,' for instance, the government
obtained forfeiture of an entire "120-acre parcel of land with a house, two barns
and several small outbuildings," even though most of the estate had no direct
relationship to either of the defendant's two cocaine transactions. 2'
Section 881's "innocent owner" defense is particularly relevant to the focus
of this Note.' Most courts have interpreted the provision to prohibit
forfeiture of property if the owner can demonstrate that the illicit drg activity
took place without his or her knowledge or consent.' Typically, application
of the provision is straightforward.' If the owner can satisfy the court's
interpretation of "innocence," then none of the property is forfeited. 2?
However, if more than one party has an interest in the property, but only one
party can establish innocence, then only the innocent party's interest in the
291. These courts interpret § 881(a)(7) to require a "substantial connection" between theproperty and the drug offense. See, e.g., United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. 31 N.W. 136th Court, 711 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (S.D. Fla. 1989).292. These courts interpret § 881(a)(7) to permit forfeiture where the property and crime are
only remotely connected. See, e.g., 141st St. Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d at 880 (holding that "theplain language of the statute indicates Congress' intent that an entire parcel of land may be subject
to forfeiture even if only part of it is directly connected to drug activity*); 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889F.2d at 1271 (stating that the forfeiture of property with no direct relationship to the crime falls
"squarely within the statutory framework for civil forfeitures that Congress has expressly
provided").
293. 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989).
294. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1260-61, 1270. The court in 4492 S. Livonia was
unable to entertain the defendant's challenge to the scope of the forfeiture because he had failed to
raise it in the district court. Id. at 1270. The court stated that the harsh outcome fell "squarely
within" § 881 (a)(7), but rhetorically indicated its concern about the scope of the section's application
by asking whether a drug transaction in a shed on King Ranch would result in the loss of its entire
800,000 acres. Id. at 1270, 1271.
Another example of the relatively weak connection required between the property subject toforfeiture and the alleged crime is provided by United States v. 141st St. Corp. by Hersh. The courtpermitted forfeiture of 41 units of an apartment building when only 15 units had been used for drug
activity. 141st Street Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d at 882. The court reasoned that the "natural
construction [of § 881 (a)(7) was] that 'the whole' of any tract of land is subject to forfeiture if any
'part' of it is used to facilitate narcotics activity." Id. at 880.
295. Section 881(a)(7) states that "no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the
extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to havebeen committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7)(1988) (emphasis added). For an in-depth discussion of the interpretation of this provision, see
Zajac, supra note 185, at 566-77.
296. Zajac, supra note 185, at 567. There is currently a split among the federal courts
concerning whether the statute requires a lack of both knowledge and consent. Id. However, the
correct interpretation is of no consequence for the purpose of this note.
297. Id. at 579.
298. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [1995], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss2/10
tI lfl,
1995] TENANCY BY THE ENvlltJ y i 1V
property is exempt from the forfeiture.' Therefore, the court must determine
the innocent owner's interest and order a forfeiture of the remaining property.
If a married couple holds property as tenants in common or joint tenants,
the court's determination is simple.' Under the relation-back provision of
Section 881, the commission of the crime operates as a conveyance of the
property to the government. 3 ' In the case of tenants in common, because
either spouse is free to alienate his or her interest, the commission of the offense
simply creates a tenancy in common between the innocent owner and the
government.' The government can then seek partition and sell its fifty
percent interest without the innocent owner's consent.' Similarly, if a
married couple holds property as joint tenants, the guilty spouse's illegal act
operates as a unilateral conveyance to the government and severs the estate
through the destruction of the unities of time and title?, As a result, the
government holds title to one-half of the property as tenants in common with the
innocent spouse.5 Again, the government can force a sale. 306  However,
the tenancy by the entirety cannot be terminated by a unilateral conveyance.'
Its right to survivorship is indestructible.' Therefore, the difficult question
for the courts is what interest in the property, if any, vests in the government
when one tenant by the entirety commits a Section 881 offense without the
knowledge or consent of the other tenant.'
The majority of the courts have resolved the conflict by prohibiting
forfeiture altogether, reasoning that state law should be applied to determine
what interests, if any, are available to the government. 310 The majority view,
299. Zajac, supra note 185, at 579.
300. Id.
301. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988).
302. Zajac, supra note 185, at 579.
303. Id. at 580.
304. Id. at 579.
305. See supra note 185.
306. Zajac, supra note 185, at 579.
307. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
309. Zajac, supra note 185, at 579.
310. See, e.g., United States v. 35 Acres, More or Less, in Cherokee Country, 940 F.2d 654
(4th Cir. 1991); United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v.
One Parcel of Real Estate at 11885 S.W. 209th Ave., 669 F. Supp. 1531 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 2525
Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 343, demonstrates the reasoning typically relied upon by courts that remove
the entireties estate from § 881's operation when one tenant is deemed innocent. The Leroy court
found no language in the civil forfeiture provisions that required application of the federal common
law of property. Id. at 347. As a result, the court applied state law to determine the interest of the
"innocent owner." Id. The court noted that "state laws governing tenancies by the entirety have
been applied by federal courts in determining the interests available for the satisfaction of a federal
tax lien, where the tax lien statute, like the forfeiture statutes, contained no definition of property
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however, is not unanimous. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly
rejected the notion that the government is entitled to nothing when an entireties
estate co-owned by an innocent spouse is subject to civil forfeiture under Section
881.
In United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue,3 ' the court recognized that
various outcomes were possible in such a circumstance. -112  The court
explained, however, that absolute denial of forfeiture was contrary to theimportant public interest in forfeiture of property as used in drug related
crimes.313  The court further reasoned that the majority rule"' denying
forfeiture, but permitting the government to file a lis pendens3"5 and wait for
rights." Id. at 347-48. The court held that since the entireties estate could not be terminated by theunilateral act of one tenant under Michigan law, the "[g]overnment [was] precluded from obtaining[the guilty spouse's] interest in the property unless and until [the innocent spouse] predecease[d] herhusband or the entireties estate [was] otherwise terminated by dissolution of marriage or joint
conveyance." Id. at 351.
The court's holding placed the government in essentially the same position as a judgment
creditor who, under Michigan law, could not force a sale of an entireties estate to satisfy the debt
of an individual tenant. Id. at 350. As a result, the only recourse available to the government was
to wait for the estate to terminate in a manner which would allow the government to satisfy itsinterest. Id. at 352. The government could satisfy its interest only if one of the following occurred:(1) the innocent spouse died before the guilty spouse; (2) the couple divorced; or (3) "their interests[became] transmitted into some divisible form by their actions or by law." Id.311. 949 F.2d 73 (3rd Cir. 1991). In Lincoln Avenue, a pharmacy was owned by a husband
and wife as tenants by the entirety. Id. at 74. The husband was convicted of conducting illegal drug
activities on the premises of the pharmacy. Id. The wife was found innocent of any wrongdoing
and satisfied the requirements of § 881(a)(7)'s "innocent" owner defense. Id.312. Id. at 76. The court listed three possible outcomes. Id. First, because underPennsylvania law each entireties tenant owns the whole estate, forfeiture of the guilty spouse'sinterest could result in forfeiture of the whole estate, thus leaving nothing for the innocent spouse.Id. Second, the innocent spouse's interest in the whole estate could require that the innocent spouse
retain the whole estate, leaving nothing for the government. Id. Finally, an intermediate resolution
of forfeiture of one-half of the property could be possible. Id. The alternatives available for the
court's selection, however, were "substantially narrowed" by the government's motion to alter or
amend the judgment, which essentially requested immediate forfeiture of the guilty spouse's interestbut agreed to leave the innocent spouse's property rights entirely intact. Id. at 77. The court
granted the government's motion. Id.
313. Id. at 78.
314. The court explicitly referenced United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Avenue, 894 F.2d 1511(1 th Cir. 1990), because it was used as the foundation of the district court's decision. 1SC0LincoLn
Avenue, 949 F.2d at 78.
315. Lis pendens literally means a "pending suit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (6th ed.1990). It is a common law doctrine that is effective in many states only after filing a notice. Id.Upon filing, subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the property are bound to the results of
"any pending lawsuit which may affect the title to, any lien on, or possession of the property." Id.Courts that prohibit forfeiture of tenancy by the entirety property when one tenant is innocentgenerally follow the Leroy Lane approach. United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343 (6th
Cir. 1990). See supra note 310.
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the estate to terminate, likewise frustrates the strong national interest in
forfeiture.316 Frustration occurs because the guilty spouse is allowed to retain
title and enjoy the property used in illegal drug activities for the remainder of
his or her lifetime.317 Clearly, at least the Third Circuit views the thick armor
surrounding the entireties estate as penetrable by federal forfeiture laws.
The dissenting opinion in United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane,"' a recent
case following the majority approach, was also harshly critical of the majority
rule.3 9 The dissent's fundamental criticism of the majority's decision was that
it overlooked the policy underlying the federal criminal penaltym
2
' of
forfeiture-swift, certain, and severe punishment, of uniform implementation,
to deter future participants in the growing nationwide drug trade. 32' The
dissent argued that because of the important policy behind the forfeiture
provision, its application to the entireties estate could not be governed by the
standard judgment creditor/single-spouse debtor analysis.'m The dissent
further argued that the policies underlying the forfeiture provisions would be
seriously eroded if application of the provisions was made to depend upon
diverse state property laws.'
After accusing the majority of an "overweaning solicitude for state property
law," 3 ' the dissent summarized the majority's disposition as a "public
announcement to criminal defendants [that the] penal consequences of their
conduct will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, despite their violation of
federal lws."3' The dissent was especially critical of the majority's reliance
on what it termed the "arcane and archaic" approach to the estate by the
entireties, rather than on the clear policy determinations underlying the federal
316. ]SOO Lincoln Avenue, 949 F.2d at 78.
317. Id. The court also concluded that the majority rule is procedurally cumbersome because,
upon filing a Us pendens, the forfeiture proceeding is indefinitely suspended, while the government
waits for the guilty spouse to acquire a separate interest in the estate, an event which may never
occur if, for instance, the innocent spouse outlives the guilty spouse. Id. Furthermore, the court
observed that termination of the estate may occur years later, when proof of relevant facts "would
often be extremely difficult if not impossible." Id.
318. 910 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1990) (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 353.
320. The government sought forfeiture in Leroy Lane under both the civil and criminal Title
21 forfeiture provisions, 21 U.S.C. §§ 881, 853, respectively. Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 345. The
dissent argued that the majority's decision was not supported under either provision. Id. at 353
(Krupansky, J., dissenting).
321. Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 353.
322. United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 353 (6th Cir. 1990).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. (emphasis in original).
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forfeiture schemes.3" Under the dissent's approach, the entireties estate
would be severed upon commission of the crime and converted into a tenancy
in common between the government and the innocent spouse."'
The government's ability to pierce the tenancy by the entirety and force
partition and sale of entireties property demonstrates that the traditional
treatment of the tenancy by the entirety must be reevaluated when its continued
recognition frustrates important policy goals.3" Drug forfeiture cases have
recognized that the rights of even truly "innocent" co-tenants, derived from the
ancient genesis of the entireties estate, should not frustrate implementation of
important public policy.329 The immense scope of the drug forfeiture laws isjustified on several grounds. It is consistent with the government's directive to
"crack down" on drug offenders .33  It fills the gaps left by existing drug
legislation. 33' Also, drug offenders should not be permitted to benefit from
their wrongdoing.332 Finally, swift, certain, and severe consequences for drug
326. Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 354. The dissent further characterized the alternative of a Lis
pendens as "a forfeiture in name only, devoid of practical consequence." Id. at 356.
327. United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 356 (6th Cir. 1990). United States v.11885 S. W. 46th St., which was reversed on remand, further demonstrates the propensity ofjudges,
faced with a nationwide social crisis, to overcome the antiquated restrictions accompanying the
entireties estate. United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at 11885 S.W. 46 St., 715 F. Supp.355 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (on remand from United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at 11885 S.W.46 Street, 751 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1990)). In 46th Street, the husband was arrested at hishome when he attempted to purchase cocaine from a government agent. He and his wife held theproperty as tenants by the entirety. The wife was completely unaware of the events surrounding her
husband's arrest. The court applied state law to determine the innocent wife's interest in theproperty, but determined that the interest must be calculated at the time the offense was committed.
46th Street, 715 F. Supp. at 359. The court reasoned that forfeiture upon commission of the crime
through the relation-back provision placed the government in co-possession of the property with the
innocent owner. Id. As a result, the unities of time, title, possession and marriage were destroyed.
Id. Accordingly, the estate became a tenancy in common, leaving the government free to seekpartition of the property and sell its one-half interest without the innocent wife's consent. Id. at 359-
60.
United States v. Moises Ponce & Ramona Ponce, 751 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Haw. 1990) serves
as another example. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the government on the issue
of forfeiture of the husband's interest in property that he held with his wife as tenants by the
entirety. Ponce, 751 F. Supp. at 1441. The husband conceded that his interest in the property was
forfeitable, but the wife contended that she was an innocent owner. Id. at 1439. The court held thatdisposition of the issue of forfeiture of the wife's interest was inappropriate through a summaryjudgment motion but, without explanation on division of the entireties estate, ordered that the
husband's interest be forfeited. Id. at 1441-42.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 311-27.
329. Id.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 283-87.
331. See supra text accompanying note 288.
332. See supra text accompanying note 315.
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offenses will deter future offenders.333 On balance, these policies outweigh
the "innocent" co-tenant's rights to an undisturbed interest in the entireties
estate. Accordingly, the government can convert the entireties estate into a
tenancy in common,33' sell it, and reimburse the innocent spouse for his or her
one-half interest."3
Arguably, if the primarily punitive policy behind civil forfeiture laws can
justify forced partition of the entireties estate, then a policy designed to provide
support for children and reduce society's responsibility for their care should
demand a similar result.33 By way of analogy, the theory behind this Note's
proposal and the theory underlying property forfeiture for drug-related offenses
are remarkably similar. Implementation of this Note's proposal would be
consistent with the national commitment to strict child support enforcement.
3 7
Eliminating the tenancy by the entirety method of escaping child support would
eliminate a gap in the existing enforcement techniques. Like the drug offender,
the delinquent obligor should not be permitted to benefit from his illegal act.
33s
Moreover, unlike the drug offender, the delinquent obligor benefits at the direct
expense of his dependent children. Finally, like the deterrent achieved through
aggressive drug forfeitures, implementation of this Note's proposal- will send a
clear message to delinquent obligors that their irresponsibility will not be
tolerated. These policies, combined with the assurance that the "innocent"
subsequent spouse is adequately compensated, justify a narrow exception to the
entireties estate's inviolability to third parties for child support enforcement.
The following proposal provides a means to achieve that end.
333. See supra text accompanying note 321.
334. Perhaps the more realistic view is that the actions of the offending co-tenant, not the
forfeiture laws, sever the entireties estate. See United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, 890 F.2d 659,
665 (3d Cir. 1989) (Greenburg, J., dissenting).
335. Admittedly, only a small minority of decisions actually subscribe to this view. However,
the protection of the entireties estate is typically only extended to the "innocent" spouse because the
court determined that the language of the federal law, unlike this note's proposal, did not explicitly
demand a contrary result. See supra note 309.
336. See supra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
337. President Clinton, when addressing a joint session of Congress on February 17, 1993,
stated that his administration will strive to "give this country the toughest child support enforcement
it has ever had." OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, hild Support Report, Vol. XV, No.
3 (Mar. 1993) at 1. The President insisted that "[iut is time to demand that people take
responsibility for the child they bring into this world." Id.
338. Admittedly, under this note's proposal, property need not be purchased with money ear-
marked for child support to be subject to forced sale. However, such a requirement also does not
exist under drug forfeiture laws. Although forfeiture laws were originally justified by the fiction
that the property was considered the offender, they, like this note's proposal, currently extend
beyond property that is directly connected with the wrongful activity. See supra note 289.
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VI. PROPOSAL AND ANALYSIS
A. Proposed Statute to Create a Child Support Exception to the Tenancy
by the Entirety Asset Shield
Because the problem presented by the tenancy by the entirety is that itpermits the obligor to insulate his property interest from a money judgment
against him, the logical place to create a new child support remedy is in the lien
provision of the CSEA. -  As explained in Section IV, the characteristics of
the tenancy by the entirety vary significantly from state to state.30 Therefore,
federal legislation is required to achieve uniform treatment of the estate as a
resource available for the satisfaction of child support arrearages. The CSEA
is an ideal vehicle to achieve this end; it already imposes a number of specific
requirements on states wishing to qualify for federal reimbursement for their
AFDC programs." Because conditioning reimbursement on compliance
amounts to a multi-million dollar threat, most states have steadfastly obeyed.'
Furthermore, the CSEA requires that its provisions be applicable to all child
support cases.'
Section 666(a)(4) of the CSEA requires states to enact "[pirocedures under
which liens are imposed against real and personal property for amounts of
overdue support owed by an absent parent who resides or owns property in theState."' The House Committee on Ways and Means envisioned this
provision as a compliment to the CSEA's income withholding provisions, and
particularly useful in obtaining child support payments from obligors who are
not salaried employees, but have substantial assets or income. 5 Because of
its vague language, however, the provision leaves much to be desired.'
While the following amendment to Section 666(a)(4) makes no attempt to define
the precise mechanism for lien attachment and execution, an area which is
"often the subject of minute statutory regulation," 347 it does ensure that the
will of Congress and the interests of dependent children will not be frustrated
by the anachronistic entireties estate. It further ensures that the subsequent
spouse of a delinquent obligor is compensated for her interest in the entireties
property.
339. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(4) (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 118, 143-46.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 201-38.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 111-23.
342. LIEBERMAN, supra note 39, at 92.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
344. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(4) (1988).
345. H.R. RP. No. 527, 98th Cong., 1st Ses. 37 (1983).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
347. Hoiowrrz, supra note 95, at 82.
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The amendment to Section 666(a)(4) should read as follows."
(a)(4) Procedures under which liens are imposed and executed
against real and personal property for amounts of overdue support
owed by an absent parent who resides or owns property in the state.
These procedures shall be modeled after existing procedures for lien
attachment and execution applicable to money judgments with the
following exceptions:
(i) Property Rights Subject to Attachment and Execution.
The following shall be subject to attachment and execution for the
purpose of obtaining satisfaction of a child support arrearage
judgment:
All personal property, as limited by state statutory exemptions, to
the extent of the absent parent's interest therein, and all real property,
notwithstanding state statutory homestead exemptions, including any
right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole
of any tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements thereon
to the extent of the absent parent's interest therein.
Where personal or real property, as defined above, is held by the
entirety by the absent parent and a subsequent spouse, entry of a final
judgment against the absent parent for a child support arrearage shall
operate to convert the entirety to a tenancy in common for the
purposes of lien attachment and execution.3 9
(ii) Distribution of Proceeds.
The proceeds from any sale of property under procedures
fashioned in accordance to this subsection shall be distributed in the
following order:
(A) First, to pay the full extent of any ownership interest that is
held by a party other than the absent parent as determined by court
order including, in the case of a party with a security interest in the
property sold, any outstanding principle and interest due under the
security agreement plus attorney's fees and other reasonable costs
348. The original language of 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(4) is shown in italics in this proposed
amendment.
349. This conversion would permit the custodial parent to force a sale of the entireties estate.
See supra note 185.
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recoverable under the agreement;
(B) Second, any remaining proceeds shall be used to reimburse
the costs incurred by the custodial parent in lien attachment and
execution;
(C) Third, any remaining proceeds shall be applied to reduce or
satisfy the arrearage judgment.
(D) Fourth, any remaining proceeds shall be used to pay the full
extent of any unsecured ownership interest that is held by a party other
than the absent parent as determined by court order;
(E) Fifth, any remaining proceeds shall be awarded to the absent
parent.
The purpose of proposed subparagraph (a)(4)(i) is fourfold. First, it is
intended to provide explicit language defining property rights in child support
cases so as to avoid application of state law which, to the extent it governs
tenancy by the entirety, would frustrate the goal of the amendment.'
Second, the provision is intended to remain consistent with state personal
property law, except as it applies to tenancy by the entirety, by limiting the
personal property subject to attachment and execution by state statutory
exemptions.Y' Third, the provision's preemption of state statutory homestead
exemptions is intended to prohibit the use of homestead exemptions to frustrate
350. The Supreme Court has often instructed that 'federal law will preempt state law ifCongress expressly provides for preemption,. . . if the state law and the federal law are in actual
conflict so that compliance with both is physically impossible or the state law obstructs the
accomplishment of the full objectives of Congress." United States v. One Single Family Residence,
894 F.2d 1511, 1517 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing International Paper Co. v. Ovellette, 479 U.S. 481,
491-92 (1987); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987)). In
federal tax lien and drug forfeiture cases, the majority of the courts apply state law to determine the
extent of the nondelinquent taxpayer or innocent owner's interest in the property, reasoning that
application of state law was intended by Congress because the federal statutes fail to expressly
require application of federal law. See, e.g., Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960)(applying state law to determine'the legal interest of a federal taxpayer); United States v. Leroy
Lane, 910 F.2d 343,347 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying state law to determine the interest of an innocent
owner under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)).
351. Some state statutes permit child support obligees to defeat personal property exemptions.
IDAHO CODE § 11-607(a)(1) (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-107 (1980) (providing that no
property is exempted from attachment and garnishment). Furthermore, some courts have held that
certain benefits are unprotected by these exemptions in domestic relations cases. Meadows v.
Meadows, 619 P.2d 598 (Okla. 1980) (holding that exemptions for social security benefits do not
apply to alimony); Dillard v. Dillard, 341 S.W.2d 668, 675 (rex. Civ. App. 1961) (holding that
veteran benefit's anti-assignment provision is inapplicable to support payments).
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the purpose of the amendment.352 This clause is consistent with the policy of
removing barriers to child support collection and is not without precedent.
353
Not only has the Supreme Court determined that state homestead rights do not
protect property from tax lien-foreclosure under I.R.C. Section 6321,3- but
many state courts have held that child support liens may defeat homestead
exemptions.355 Such holdings are based on recognition of the absurdity of
denying maintenance to children under exemption laws which were originally
designed to protect them.3'
Finally, and most importantly, subparagraph (a)(4)(i) is intended to
effectuate the goal of this Note. The provision requires that tenancy by the
entirety property be converted to tenancy in common immediately upon entry of
an arrearage judgment against the absent parent.357 The automatic trans-
formation of the property to a tenancy in common permits the custodial parent
to proceed against the property and force its sale.
31
The purpose of the exception detailed in proposed subparagraph (a)(4)(ii)
is primarily to ensure that co-tenants by the entireties and secured interest-
holders are adequately compensated for their interests in the entireties
estate.359 This provision places the spouse of a delinquent obligor first in the
line to recover any equity she may have in the entireties estate, as calculated
upon conversion of the estate to a tenancy in common. Unlike the existing law
on real property forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. Section 881(a)(7), no determination
of the nondelinquent spouse's "innocence" is required.' In other words, she
is reimbursed for her one-half interest in the property regardless of her
knowledge or consent of her husband's failure to pay child support to his
352. See supra note 200 for a discussion of homestead exemptions.
353. Proposed § 666(a)(4)(i) is admittedly somewhat beyond the scope of this note. Homestead
exemptions may apply to any real property, regardless of how it is held. The homestead exemption
may therefore serve as an obstacle to recovery of child support arrearages in addition to the tenancy
by the entirety. See supra note 200.
354. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 667 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 269-
76.
355. See, e.g., Bickel v. Bickel, 495 P.2d 154 (Ariz. App. 1972); Winter v. Winter, 145 N.W.
709 (Neb. 1914); Breedlove v. Breedlove, 691 P.2d 426 (Nev. 1984).
356. HoRoW1Tz, supra note 95, at 78.
357. This provision was modeled afer a similar provision offered in Zajac, supra note 185, at
587, as a resolution of the conflict between the rights of the government and innocent tenants by the
entirety in the context of federal civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
358. See infra text and accompanying notes 363-85 for justification of this modification to the
common law.
359. This provision is modeled after an amendment to 21 U.S.C. § 88 1(e)(2) in Saltzburg,
supra note 289, at 241, proposed to ensure that innocent ownership rights are protected in federal
drug forfeiture proceedings.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 295-99.
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children from a previous marriage." The provision further requires that the
custodial parent's collection expenses be reimbursed before the arrearage amount
is reduced.3 2
B. Analysis of Proposed Modification to the Tenancy by the Entirety
Public policy is the basis for creating a child support exception to the asset
shield enjoyed by entireties property holders. A balance must be struck between
the policies supporting the current forms of tenancy by the entirety and the
policies served by the exception. This Note contends that the scales weigh
heavily in favor of elimination of the entireties obstacle to allow quick and
complete arrearage collections.
As discussed in Section IV, the tenancy by the entirety estate is ancient in
origin. ' Much of the original justification for the creation of the estate is,
today, offensive and obsolete. The legal identity of women is no longer
considered subsumed by their husbands upon marriage. No one can seriously
argue that women are generally incapable of owning and maintaining property
or fail to contribute financially to the marital assets. As a result, the
anachronistic, male-dominated tenancy by the entirety is a thing of the past.'
Ironically, the demise of the husband-controlled entireties estate, while a
victory for women in general, ultimately exacerbated the problem of child
361. By comparing the spouse of a drug felon to the spouse of a delinquent child support
obligor, a strong argument can be made that the non-delinquent spouse should lose some, if not all,
of her interest in the entireties estate if she knows of and consents to her husband's failure to honorhis child support obligation. Like the drug felon's spouse, the non-delinquent spouse may enjoy thebenefits of the money saved by her husband's disregard for the law. Indeed, the property subjectto forced sale may have been purchased in whole or in part with money gained as a result of child
support non-payment. In most instances, the non-delinquent spouse is no doubt aware of her
husband's support obligation and knows that he is ignoring it. Like the drug felon's spouse, it is
reasonable to expect the non-delinquent spouse to make some effort to prevent her husband's illegal
activity or incur some loss as a result of her acquiescence.
While permitting "innocent" spouses to recover their full interest in entireties property sold
pursuant to this note's proposal may not adequately address collusive conduct between spouses, this
author believes that the threat of a forced sale of the family home will be sufficient to discourage
such activity. As one judge observed in the context of drug forfeitures, "[I]f the destruction wrought
by [lawbreakers] is brought home to their own families, perhaps at least some of them may bedissuaded from their activities." United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, 890 F.2d 659, 665 (3d. Cir.
1989).
362. In other words, this provision, unlike many traditional lien attachment and execution
schemes, ensures that all of the expenses incurred in collecting the arrearage are paid for by the
delinquent obligor who, after all, is responsible for the arrearage in the first place.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 177-94.
364. No state continues to recognize the common law incident of a husband's exclusive right
to control of the estate. POWELL, supra note 177, 620.4.
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support collection and, therefore, contributed to the negative effects of
nonsupport on women. In the past, states that viewed the marital unit as
personified by the husband-that is, states which rejected the concept of mutual
control-permitted the husband's individual creditors to levy on the marital
property to satisfy his debts.' Today, mutual control of the estate protects
both spouses' interests and denies third parties, including custodial parents,
access to either spouse's interest.' As a result, the custodial parent's support
arrearage judgment cannot be satisfied. Unpaid support, in turn, contributes to
the "feminization of poverty." 7 Therefore, the intention behind the shift to
mutual control of entireties property, removal of gender-based inequity, would
be furthered by a child support exception to the estate's inviolability.
The entireties estate's inviolability to creditors is primarily defended on
grounds that it protects the marital unit.' Since neither spouse can encumber
or alienate the marital property, each is provided security from the other's poor
judgment.' By protecting the institution of marriage from financial ruin,
families remain intact and the attendant benefits of family life are reaped by
society.' The judgment-proof entireties estate clearly protects spouses from
financial set-backs, albeit at the direct expense of creditors. Beyond that,
however, its value to the institution of marriage and society in general has been
speculative at best, as evidenced by the steady decline in the traditional family
unit.37' The twenty-five states that refuse to affirmatively recognize the
tenancy by the entirety are apparently equally unimpressed with its purported
social value.3 2
Furthermore, the concept of mantal unity, from a legal viewpoint, has
become increasingly less viable. In 1972, Justice Brennan wrote that a married
couple is "not an independent entity. . . but an association of two individuals
. . Some argue that personal autonomy as an ideology is as pressing
365. See supra text accompanying note 222. Creditors were able to access either the husband's
income interest or survivorship interest. PowEi, supra note 177, 622.3. See, e.g., Friedman
v. Harold, 638 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1981); Whetstone v. Coslick, 157 So. 666 (Fla. 1934); Beland
v. Estey, 351 A.2d 62 (N.H. 1976); King v. Greene, 153 A.2d 49 (NJ. 1959).
366. POwE m, supra note 177, 622.3.
367. Pearce, supra note 66, at 413. See supra text accompanying notes 66-74.
368. See supra text accompanying note 196.
369. Craig, supra note 179, at 294.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 198-99.
371. Craig, supra note 179, at 294. See supra note 42.
372. Only 25 of the 50 states recognize some form of the tenancy by the entirety. See supra
notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
373. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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as that for marital partnership. 4 Others believe that marriage is becoming
a matter of personal fulfillment. 5 Of course, if the rights and privileges of
individual spouses are worthy of recognition, enforcement of individual
obligations must follow. Mary Ann Glendon posits that recognition of the
individual is a natural legal trend of progressive societies.376 Quoting Sir
Henry Maine, she observed:
The movement of progressive societies has been uniform in one
respect: Through all its course it has been distinguished by the
gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual
obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily substituted for the
Family as the unit of which civil laws take account.3"
This Note's objective is not to diminish the significance of marriage as an
institution. Nor does this Note propose wholesale abolition of the tenancy by
the entirety.3" The proposition herein merely asserts that persons who assume
the obligation of supporting their children should not be permitted to escape that
responsibility under the guise of a deteriorating policy that is defended on the
ground that it fosters the very family life which, in this context, it injures."
Even accepting the proposition that protection of the marital unit is a sufficientjustification for erecting the entireties shield against creditors, a child support
exception should have a relatively small effect when compared to the potential
effects of opening the estate to creditors in general.'
The policies supporting a modification of the tenancy by the entirety for
child support collection are compelling. Most fundamental is the fact that the
noncustodial parent is morally obligated to provide for his children. Parental
responsibility, usually instinctual, has long been observed as a principle of
374. Id. at 699. In the context of opposing the concept of community property, Ruth Deech
argued that "the submergence of individual claims involved in the equal division of property on
divorce amounts to a denial of rights and an attack on individual responsibility.- Id.
375. Id. at 700.
376. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEw FAMILY AND THE NEw PROPERTY 42-43 (1981).
377. Id. (quoting SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 139-40 (Oxford Univ. Press 1959)
(1861)).
378. An elimination of the tenancy by the entirety, while accomplishing the goal of this note,
would admittedly sweep more broadly than necessary.
379. For a discussion of the effects of child support non-payment on dependent children and
their mothers, see supra text accompanying notes 56-74.
380. In 1990, there were 91.9 million households in the United States. ABsTRAcT 1993, supra
note 246, at 58, table 69. The total liabilities of these households was 3.892 trillion dollars. Id.
at 506, table 787. Therefore, the average liability per household was approximately $42,000. In
contrast, if, solely for the purpose of gross comparison, the 5.1 billion dollars in unpaid child
support in 1989, see supra text accompanying note 83, was distributed among all United States
households, then the average household "child support liability" would be approximately $55.
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natural law." Therefore, failure to care for one's offspring may be fairly
characterized as an act against nature.
In addition to disregarding this fundamental mandate, the delinquent obligor
in effect thumbs his nose at a landslide of well-intentioned legislation directed
at ensuring his compliance with his child support order.' Few areas of law
boast such an impressive array of regulation. Yet, with the protection of the
entirety estate, the delinquent obligor can legally circumvent the application of
some of the nation's most effective collection weapons. Neither the shrewdness,
nor fortuity of individuals who have broken a court-ordered support schedule,
backed by a litany of state and federal laws, should be rewarded by being
granted refuge in an entireties estate. Courts permitting the entireties shield to
protect the delinquent obligor's assets demonstrate rote deference to a relic of
American property law, and unjustifiably thwart the government's policy of
protecting our nation's children.
Retaining the entireties obstacle to child support collection is especially
unjustified when its impact on children and mothers is considered. Unlike true
creditors who loan money for a profit and can absorb delinquencies as part of
the normal cost of doing business,' many families entitled to child support
are dependent upon the support payments for their economic livelihood, and they
face undue hardship if it is not forthcoming. Nonpayment of child support
contributes to the instability of the already vulnerable single-parent home,
resulting in lasting emotional and psychological injury to dependent
children.' Furthermore, nonpayment of child support is in large part
responsible for the disproportional number of single mothers living in
poverty.'
From a pragmatic viewpoint, this Note's proposal makes sound financial
sense. When it is the delinquent obligors' irresponsibility that forces thousands
of single-parent families onto the welfare roles, the rest of society should not be
forced to pay the price. If the plight of the dependent family does not appeal
to our sense of fairness and equity, then it should, at a minimum, appeal to our
desire to reduce our huge annual contribution to their support.36 Elimination
381. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 90-129.
383. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 58-65.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
386. In 1992, the AFDC program cost federal taxpayers $14.8 billion. 1994 BUDoEr, supra
note 106, at app-62 4 . Furthermore, even though the child support collected by the federal-state
Child Support Enforcement program reduced the number of families qualified to receive AFDC
benefits, the program incurred a net loss. 16TH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 78, at 6. In fiscal
year 1991, program expenditures exceeded revenues by $201 million. Id. at 7.
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of the entireties obstacle to cl1ection of support arrearage would place at least
some of this financial burden where it belongs-on the delinquent obligor. This
end is consistent with the policies underlying virtually all federal and state child
support legislation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The nation's attitude toward delinquent child support obligors has clearly
reached the level of intolerance.' Yet, despite tough political rhetoric and
in the midst of a national blizzard of child support enforcement initiatives,
millions of delinquent obligors avoid their obligation. A portion of these do so
under the ancient umbrella of the tenancy by the entirety. The financial
protection provided by the entireties estate, however, seems to be
weakening. 3
Legislatures and courts are becoming increasingly less reverent of the
estate's heritage as they recognize its incompatibility with modern society.t 9
In light of the outdated premise underlying the entireties estate and the
destructive effects of nonsupport on dependent families and society, closure of
the entireties loophole is long overdue. So long as nondelinquent co-tenants are
adequately compensated, no sound rationale exists for permitting the obstacle
presented by the entireties asset shield. After custodial parents, like Julie,'
endure the long and frustrating .process of locating the obligor, identifying his
assets, and obtaining a judgment against him, the law should ensure that
dependent children receive prompt and complete payment of the support to
which they are legally entitled.
Robert D. Null
387. See supra text accompanying note 2.
388. Symptoms of the erosion of the tenancy by the entirety are the number of states that do
not recognize it, see supra note 207, the abundance of scholarly writings critical of the
characteristics of the estate, see supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text, the subordination of the
similar family-protection policy of statutory homestead exemptions to the IRS's objective to collect
delinquent taxes, see supra text accompanying notes 260-78, and the occasional destruction of
tenancies by the entirety to effect forfeitures of property used in the commission of drug felonies,
see supra text accompanying notes 310-35.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 310-35 (explaining federal civil forfeiture).
390. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
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